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Abstract
This thesis looks at the potential impact that European integra-
tion may have on certain aspects of national political contestation. It
begins from the idea that, because European integration has begun
to affect areas that once belonged to the domaine re´serve´ of the do-
mestic arena of politics, national systems of representation should be
affected by integration in the mean time. Some studies have looked
at this with a focus on national elections as the epitome of the repre-
sentative connection between citizens and the political elite.
Like this work, the thesis focuses on this element of political contes-
tation in national politics in relation to European unification. Based
on the literature in this area of political science, it constructs a the-
oretical model that connects the issue of European integration to the
attractiveness of political parties as options for vote choice. By do-
ing this, it deviates from the more common approach to this topic
by focusing on utility formation within the framework of a two step
rational choice model and stops short of looking at the actual choice
made by individuals in elections.
Necessary conditions under which European integration would po-
tentially affect this part of national politics are derived and then, all
but one, tested for empirically. It is found that all necessary conditions
hold. Four hypotheses are set up which stipulate that political parties
can capitalise on the issue of European integration, that this potential
has increased over time, that extreme parties benefit more from this
issue than others and that the issue has more effect if individuals are
opposed to European Unification.
The results from the empirical analysis are mixed. Evidence is
found in support of the first two hypotheses, the third can neither
be rejected nor embraced and for the fourth no evidence is found
at all. In sum, the thesis finds that the conditions for the issue of
European integration to make its way into political contestation at
the national level in respect to the relationship between citizens and
their representatives are present. In addition to this, not only do the
conditions for this exist, but one can already find evidence of the traces
of this phenomenon.
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1 Introduction
Once a country joins the European Union (EU), national politics - in theory
- becomes more than just national politics. A national government produced
through national elections then also becomes the instance which represents
the interests of its people in the European Council; still the most powerful
legislative organ in the European Union despite the increasing importance of
the European Parliament.
With the deepening and widening of the Union, the domestic1 policy areas
that are affected by the legislation of the EU are on the increase and even the
old domaine re´serve´ of social policy is no longer immune to the influences
of the EU in individual states [Leibfried, 2005]. There are no European
parties that all European citizens can vote or not vote for in Europe wide
elections, nor is there a European government that can be held accountable
in such elections at the end of a term. Because of this and in light of the
growing importance of EU politics for what happens at the national level,
one would expect issues that are now dealt with at the European level to play
an ever growing role at the national level. Seeing that the connection that
the citizens of member states have with the supra-national level of European
Union politics is via their governments, one can expect this growing role of the
European Union at the national level not to restrict itself to the impact the
EU has on national policies, but precisely because of this, that the European
level will find its way into political contestation at the national level all the
way to the polls.
This thesis, therefore, sets out to investigate whether the relationship
between citizens and their national representatives, who are also their voice
at the European level, is now subject to a newer dimension of European
integration. The connection between citizens and the political elite of a
country manifests itself in elections. But elections are not events that are
only relevant on the days that the polls open every other year, but instead are
the culmination of continued political contestation in the times in between.
1The terms domestic and national are used interchangabliy throughout this thesis. The
same holds for the terms issue and dimension.
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During this time, political parties will attempt to garner the favour of citizens,
that come election day they may increase their chances in the outcome. This
thesis will pay particular attention to the way that European integration as a
potential issue dimension, affects the way that individuals evaluate political
parties. By shifting the focus thus, it deviates slightly from the more common
approach in the literature on this topic.
1.1 The Research Questions
The broad question that this thesis asks and tries to answer, is whether
political parties can capitalise on the issue of European integration and what
this looks like. More specifically, can parties profit, that is gain greater
favour among a significant amount of citizens with the position they take
on European integration? In other words, can or do some parties profit
more than others or do perhaps some even lose support due to the position
they take on EU integration? Are pro- and anti-EU integration positions of
equal significance? Are the effects of EU integration positions different across
parties that occupy different places in the left/right spectrum? Do extreme
parties stand to gain more than mainstream parties? If such phenomena can
be observed, have they changed over time?
The literature reviewed in section 2 looks at the effects or potential effects
that individual preferences and party positions on European integration have
on the electoral decision. This thesis will stop short of looking at electoral
outcomes and will instead concentrate on the influence that positions on
European integration could have on the attractiveness of political parties to
citizens.
It has been a while since the idea was forwarded that European integration
may become a new issue dimension on which political parties will have to
compete as well in the national setting. This idea is best known as the
sleeping giant hypothesis [van der Eijk and Franklin, 2001]. The inventors of
this term as well as other researchers (see for e.g. de Vries [2007]) present the
idea that most notably smaller parties, particularly those that can be found
at the extremities of the left/right spectrum, will be able to profit from
9
the manifestation of individual positions on European integration. This will
be a particular focus of the thesis and encompassed in the second research
question. A further related question (the third research question), which
takes up a suggestion made by Tillman [2004], in a slightly adapted form,
is whether pro- and anti-EU positions influence preferences about parties
in about the same order of magnitude. In sum, this thesis deals with the
following questions:
1. Can national political parties capitalise on the issue of Euro-
pean integration?
2. Has the importance of the issue of EU integration for the at-
tractiveness of political parties to citizens changed (increased)
over time?
3. Do extreme political parties profit more from their positions
on European integration than more mainstream parties?
4. Do anti-EU positions have a greater effect on the attractive-
ness of political parties than pro-EU positions?
The first question is of a rather general nature. It wishes to establish
whether some, any or all political parties can profit (or perhaps also lose) on
the position they take regarding European integration. The second question
of whether this situation has changed over time, wishes to establish whether
the disappearance of what became known as the ’permissive concesus’ has
led to an impact of European integration issues in the national party scene of
member states from the perspective of the citizen in the sense of the individ-
ual demands on political parties. The third research question asks whether
parties that lie at the extremities of the left/right dimension - termed extreme
parties in this thesis - stand to gain more from the European integration di-
mension than more moderate parties. It has been suggested that moderate
parties do not offer much choice on the European integration dimension (this
is looked at and discussed in greater detail in section 5.4) than extreme par-
ties. Should European integration be an issue of relevance for citizens and
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should the choices offered by more extreme parties deviate significantly from
these, European integration positions of parties would be a factor that would
play a role in the way parties are viewed by individual persons. The last re-
search question is related to the third. Parties in government are parties
that have been and are involved in the process of European integration and
will therefore rarely be viewed as anti-integrationist (for a related discus-
sion and implications, see Manow and Do¨ring [2007]). Citizens that view
European integration as disadvantageous to themselves or their country as
a whole, may accord more importance to anti-EU integration positions held
by parties than individuals who do not hold such positions. The latter’s
preferences are on average at least better looked after by moderate parties
and thus, the left/right dimension could be assumed to play a greater role
for those deciding between parties that occupy a similar pro- or at least not
anti-integrationist position on the European integration dimension.
1.2 Outline of the Thesis
The thesis begins in chapter 2 with a review of the literature that has been
produced in the of political science into which the research questions of this
thesis fall. This is followed by a discussion of relevant theory from politi-
cal science in chapter 3. This discussion involves elements of representation
theory pertaining particularly to the European Union and spatial models
of voting. Special attention is paid to the idea of political space and more
specifically that of a European political space, the electoral market and its
actors and the concepts of rationality and utility. The fourth chapter then
presents the theoretical framework of the thesis based on the preceding liter-
ature review and theoretical discussion. The framework is a rational choice
one and the assumptions made about the actors and structures involved are
described. The chapter also identifies and describes five necessary conditions
under which it is assumed that the issue of European integration may im-
pact voting behaviour in national elections. However, the model outlined in
chapter 4 is not a voting model, but as will be explained, aims to to set up
a framework in which the utility that individuals accord to political parties
11
can be understood.
Chapter 5 is the longest chapter in this thesis and has a number of objec-
tives. It first describes the data that will be used in the empirical sections and
presents the case selection. It then operationalises the research questions and
turns them into testable hypotheses. The dependent variable is described in
greater detail as it differs from that of vote choice which is most often used in
the literature reviewed. Three different statistical models are then set up to
which the data is then later applied. At least half of the chapter is dedicated
to an empirical analysis of the necessary conditions that were identified for
the theoretical framework. This includes conditions on political parties and
the electorate with regard to preferences and positions on issue dimensions,
as well as identifying the dimensionality of the European political space.
The four hypotheses that are set up in an attempt to answer the research
questions are subjected to empirical analyses in chapter 6 with the use of
the statistical models from the prior section. Chapter 7 summarises and
concludes the thesis.
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2 Literature Review
The literature looking at the effects of European integration on electoral
dynamics at the national level is no longer entirely novel. The focus of
scholars studying in this area, varies from effects on the party landscape,
the connection between elections to the European parliament and national
parliament to more specifically voting behaviour in national elections on its
own. The focus of this thesis is on the last of these issues and thus, this
is where the focus of the literature review presented in this chapter will lie.
Nevertheless, the literature looking at the first two of the three questions will
also be touched upon insofar as it helps to give an overview of the state of
affairs in this area of research.
The majority of studies in this area has concentrated on elections to
the European Parliament surrounding particularly the ’second order’ phe-
nomenon [Reif and Schmitt, 1980]. Such studies have dealt with the obser-
vation that in European parliamentary elections turnout tends to be lower
and that government and big parties lose whereas small and extreme parties
win votes in comparison to national election outcomes [Schmitt, 2005, der
Eijk and Franklin, 1991, van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996a]. The literature
looking at the effects of European integration on party systems has, in gen-
eral, found very little evidence for any kind of impact (see for example Mair
[2000]). The literature on the effect of European integration on the dynamics
in national elections has to date received the least attention. Nevertheless,
in the last decade, some literature addressing such questions has emerged. It
presents and finds evidence for what has received the term EU issue voting
hypothesis [Gabel, 2000, Tillman, 2004, de Vries, 2007, Tillman, 2009]. This
hypothesis posits that the preferences over European integration influence
vote decisions in national elections.
Common to most of the literature trying to identify the existence or non-
existence of some kind of effect of European integration on vote choice, is
the identification of conditions under which this can potentially be the case.
The point of departure for most of this literature is the ’sleeping giant’ hy-
pothesis first presented by van der Eijk and Franklin in 2001. The authors
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define the ’sleeping giant’ hypothesis as as a situation where,”[...] despite its
apparent irrelevance for political behavior, [pro-anti EU orientation] consti-
tutes something of a ”sleeping giant” that has the potential, if awakened, to
impel voters to political behavior that (because of its orthogonality with left-
right orientations) undercuts the bases for contemporary party mobilization
in many, if not most, European polities. ”.
One of the most cited papers in this line of argument is that by de Vries
[2007] in which she investigates the hypothesis forwarded by van der Eijk
and Franklin. For this, she first defines the term rather commonly used
in the literature afterwards of EU issue voting as ”the process in which
attitudes towards European integration translate into national vote choice.”
She argues that EU issue voting is conditional on the following two factors:
1. the ”degree of issue salience among voters” and
2. the ”extent of partisan conflict over Europe”.
The second condition is important because the ’giant’ will awaken if there
is opportunity for individuals to express their preferences on EU-integration.
Tillman [2004], writing prior to the 2007 de Vries article, presents four
conditions that in no way contradict but add to those of de Vries listed above.
These would be that:
1. citizens must be able to form preferences about European integration
that are independent of the more ’traditional’ preferences,
2. party leadership must formulate or have positions on the issue,
3. sufficient variation in the preferences on the issue for both parties and
voters must be present and
4. the issue needs to be salient.
Nicolet [2007] takes the study of the impact of the European dimension
a level deeper and defines three conditions under which the theory would
predict it to take place. Her analysis takes place for individual parties and
not countries. She outlines one condition at the individual level, one at the
partisan level and a third at the state level:
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1. individual: EU preferences are conditional on voter sophistication
2. partisan: the effect of European integration is stronger for parties that
do not occupy middle ground on the EU dimension
3. extent of political contestation over European integration will have an
effect.
The first two points are not really conditions as those we have shown from
other literature. The crux of these two points lies more in the hypothesis that
Nicolet [2007] has behind them, which is that there is much more variance
in voter preferences and the effect over parties of European integration than
one usually assumes. She finds that much of the variance in these two can
be explained by voter sophistication and the place occupied by a party on
the EU integration dimension respectively. The third condition we also find
in de Vries [2007], but interestingly the two come to opposing conclusions.
Nicolet, unlike de Vries, finds no significant results for the extent of partisan
contestation over issues of European integration.
The results that can be found in the literature pertaining to EU issue
voting are mixed. [Tillman, 2004], for example, finds EU issue voting in all
the cases he looks at, whereas [de Vries, 2007, Tillman, 2009] find effects in
some countries but not in others in larger samples. Nevertheless, the results,
in general, present evidence that the ’sleeping giant’ has begun to awaken.
One notable exception to this is an article by Nicolet [2007]. She found that,
contrary to what the ’sleeping giant’ hypothesis would lead one to expect,
that in the countries she studied there was a decrease in the effect of the
European integration dimension over time.
All the work reviewed here, makes use of spatial models of voting; more
precisely some form of the proximity model of voting (see section 3.2.2). Vote
choice is used as the dependent variable and ,thus, some form of multinomial
or conditional logit regression models are applied for the empirical analysis.
The data is taken either from individual country election surveys or the
European Election Study. This thesis will also apply a proximity model, but
deviates from the reviewed literature in the choice of dependent variable and
choice of statistical method used.
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Another point that keeps on reappearing in the literature and will prove
of importance for what follows, is the idea that some political parties have an
interest in avoiding the development of a new dimension in the form of Eu-
ropean integration and, therefore, attempt to integrate it into the left/right
dimension (see for example [Hix and Lord, 1997]). Other parties, on the other
hand, may have an interest in doing exactly the opposite [de Vries, 2007].
These are thought to be smaller parties or extreme parties with regard to
the left/right dimension. Increased Euroscepticism [Netjies, 2004], may lead
such political parties to try to open a new dimension for contestation. This
is exactly in line with the ’sleeping giant’ hypothesis.
de Vries [2008] notes that little is known about whether political parties
gain or lose on the European integration dimension. Studies have tended to
look at a the effects on vote choice in a country in total and not at political
parties individually. There is reason to believe that there will be considerable
differences across political parties within countries. In this study of Danish,
German, Dutch and British parties, de Vries finds much variance regarding
the extent of issue voting across parties. The extent to which parties affected
is a function of opposition status, degree of EU issue salience for a party and
the level of extremism it exhibits on the EU issue dimension. She further
finds, that EU issue voting does not depend on left/right extremism, but
rather on extreme positions taken on the European integration dimension.
2.1 Lessons from the literature
In the final section of this chapter, we summarise some of the results found
in the literature that will guide the rest of this thesis.
This very brief review of some of the literature that has been produced
trying to answer questions on the potential effect of European integration
on voting behaviour in national elections shows that there are some general
conclusions starting to emerge, but that the results to not always point in the
same direction. But it can be said, that on average, evidence can be found
to support the hypothesis the European integration impacts the domestic
political contestation in some form or another and this becomes visible in
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numerous countries in national parliamentary elections.
Attention was paid in the literature review to the conditions under which
European issue voting is thought to take place by different authors. Because
these conditions will play an important role in the thesis, they are briefly
summarised here again.
• Citizens must exhibit ’real’ preferences on the European integration
dimension.
• The European integration issue dimension must be salient for citizens.
• The European integration issue dimension must largely independent of
the more traditional left/right issue dimension.
• Parties must exhibit discernible positions on the European integration
dimension.
• There must be variance over the positions of parties and citizens on the
European integration dimension.
These topics will be dealt with in greater detail in section 4.3 and analysed
empirically in section 5.4 of the ensuing chapters. This is preceded by a
general theoretical discussion in the following chapter and incorporated into
the theoretical model of the thesis in chapter 4.
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3 Theoretical Discussion
The literature reviewed in section 2, as well as the research questions of
this thesis, fit into a number of broader discussions in political science. Of
particular relevance are the debates surrounding voting behaviour and rep-
resentation. Each of these draw on further debates in the discipline. In this
section, a cursory view is thrown on representation in democratic systems
and models of voting behaviour, and elements of the concepts of rationality
and utility are discussed in preparation for the presentation in section 4 of
the theoretical model to be applied in this thesis. Nothing of what follows
bears the claim to an exhaustive review as only topics that are deemed as
important and relevant for the thesis are discussed.
3.1 Representation
This section serves to look at why it can be interesting in the first place to
pose and answer the questions of this thesis. In essence, this section takes a
closer look at the issue of democratic representation in the European Union,
something that is mostly deemed as wanting in one sense or another. Thus,
we take a little closer look at the channels of representation that exist in the
system of the European Union and what, more specifically, it is that subjects
this system to be described in conjunction with terms such as ’democratic
deficit’ and ’legitimicay crisis’. This is then discussed under the lenses of the
research questions in section 4.
The European Union may have a parliament that is directly elected by
the citizens of the member states, but aside from a few, its functions are not
the usual ones of a parliament in a democratic state; particularly it is a lot
less powerful and does not take on a central position in the entire system.
In parliamentary democracies, governments are elected by the members of
the national parliaments. Although, the European parliament is required
to agree to the choice of commissioners, the Commission can in no way be
equated with a national government. The locus of decision making power
remains with the European Council or the Council of Ministers, which are
composed of heads of state and government or relevant ministers. These are
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in turn not accountable to the European parliament, but to their respective
national parliaments (see for e.g. van der Eijk and Franklin [1996b]).
The statement by Dinan [1994] quoted in Thomassen and Schmitt [1997]
that “[i]f the European Community was a state and it applied to join the EU,
it might be turned down on the grounds that it was not a democracy” would
incite a vigorous nod of agreement on on the part of some, a smile on the
part of others or even a shrug of indifference from yet others. But there are
two points implicitly contained in this statement that are of relevance here.
First, the system of the European Union, as we have already ascertained in
the previous paragraph and however one may position oneself normatively to
this, is not comparable to the concept of democracy as we are used to it from
the democratic nation state. Second, it makes reference to what is commonly
termed, and which we have also already mentioned earlier, the ’democratic
deficit’ of the European Union.
Which channels of representation and accountability are then present in
the institutional framework of the European Union? According to Norris
[1997], those available to the national electorates of member states can be be
divided into direct and indirect channels. The former refers to elections to
the European parliament and the latter to votes cast in national elections. In
light of the research questions, we are naturally more interested in the indirect
channel of national parliamentary elections and, therefore, concentrate on
this here.
On the one hand, the national parliaments elected in national elections
choose the government which represents the country in the European Council
and Council of Ministers and appoints commissioners. Should the electorate
be dissatisfied with how they are being represented at the European level by
their respective governments, they can express this in the next national elec-
tion [Norris, 1997]2. In this way, as she notes, the European Union functions
more like an international organisation when it comes to holding national
governments accountable for their actions in the European Union.
2Norris [1997] also notes that this mechanism of retrospective voting is rather problem-
atic as Council decisions are made behind closed doors and little information is available
to the public about how national representatives acted. This makes it rather difficult for
citizens to make informed decisions in this regard.
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The channels of representation in the European Union are displayed dia-
grammatically in figure 1. The arrows marked with N refer to the channels
that are available in the national context and those labeled E to those that
are specifically European. The latter category contains, existing since 1979,
only the European parliamentary elections and has been the subject of much
research in the mean time; particularly surrounding the debate on ’second
order’ elections [Reif and Schmitt, 1980]. The former, the indirect national
channel, would theoretically - were it to be used - still be the most powerful
one under the current institutional framework. It is this channel that the
research questions of this thesis address.
Figure 1: Electoral access to European decision–making
Voters
National
Parlia-
ments
National
Govern-
ments
EU Commission
EU Councils
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Source: adapted from Mair [2000]
The concept of a ’democratic deficit’ appears often in the literature about
the European Union and is no longer something that is used only by members
of this subdiscipline. Yet, as de Vries et al. [2010] note, the concept entails
numerous ideas for which the attempt has been made by some to stylise it
into the following five points:
1. European integration has made executives more powerful as compared
to the legislative,
2. the European Parliament has a weak position compared to the Com-
mission and Council,
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3. European Parliament elections are ’second order’,
4. there exists an elite/citizen gap (decision making at the European level
is elite driven and too distant from the average citizen) and
5. many EU policies are not supported by the majority.
If one puts together what has been written on this topic over the years,
one finds that it is mostly posited that the relationship between the Euro-
pean level of politics and policy and the citizens of member states can be
summarised by three phases. Initially, a situation where European issues
were more technical than anything else, that became known as the ’permis-
sive consensus’, existed that lasted from the creation of the European Union
to the late 1980’s or early 1990’s. Tillman [2004] summarises this by three
characteristics:
1. The public is uninformed and disinterested,
2. integration is elite driven and
3. there is no ”EU issue public”.
This phase was followed by what is termed the ’democratic deficit’ out-
lined above, where citizens began to take on more interest and position them-
selves to the process of European integration. This became markedly visible
around the time of the Maastricht Treaty. Studies have argued and found
that the public does have (rational) preferences about the European Union
and that these are systematic [Carruba, 2001]. Carruba [2001] finds that
there are two opposing explanations that have been forwarded for this. In
the first, which he terms policy mood, the public has rational preferences on
issues in the sense that it becomes interested and makes an effort to inform
itself when policies lie outside of what they feel to be an “acceptable” zone.
This theory implies that policy makers or parties will wish to remain within
this zone (determined by their constituents) and will then adjust their po-
sitions accordingly. In the second, cue taking, it is assumed that the public
adopts as their own positions the positions that the parties they support
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take on an issue. The two theories both imply the same correlation between
public preferences and party positions, but opposite directions in terms of
the mechanism.
The final, or current phase, that is to be found in the literature – a
stronger idea than the ’democratic deficit – is a ’legitimacy crisis’. For many,
this became apparent at about the time of the French and Dutch no in the
referenda to the Constitutional Treaty. The results of these referenda and
the results of opinion polls in countries where they did not take place, is most
often taken to be evidence that citizens in the member states are increasingly
dissatisfied with the state of affairs in the Union [Schmidt, 2006]3.
European integration hence, fits into the broader phenomena of ’transna-
tionalisation’ and ’globalisastion’, but is yet substantially different and unique
- in the mean time rarely analysed in an international relations framwork4.
According to de Vries et al. [2010], Robert Dahl [1994] proposes that the
concept of democracy, the way it is applied to modern democracies of the
nation state, cannot simply be transfered to something like the European
Union. He thinks it can be compared to the transformation from the city
state where democracy was direct to the nation state where we experience
representative democracy. de Vries et al. [2010] further note, that Beetham
and Lord [1998] propose an alternative in the form of dual legitimation where
two channels of legtimisation, one with directly elected representatives (EP)
and one with a process at the national level via national political leaders,
exist simultaneously.
The research questions of this thesis deal with the interaction between
national political parties and the electorate in member states of the Eu-
3At this point I must say that I disagree with this conclusion with regards to the refer-
endum on the Constitutional Treaty in France. Having had the opportunity to experience
the public debate around the treaty first hand whilst studying in that year in Paris, I
tend to agree with those who claim that this referendum had at least as many domestic as
European elements to it. In my view, the most fitting description I came across was given
in a personal conversation by Laura Lund Olsen when she referred to the referendum as
’Raffarindum’ in reference to the then French prime minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin, who
incidentally also lost his job after the outcome of the referendum.
4This is exemplified by the fact that many studies of European integration in the mean
time fit into a comparative politics framework and not at all into an international relations
one.
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ropean Union. Thus, we pay only attention to the first arrow labeled N
in diagram 1, which basically stands for national parliamentary elections.
The reason why we do this is because of the consequences elections have
for the representation at the European level. Because electoral outcomes
determine the composition of national parliaments, which in turn determine
the governments which are the representatives of their respective country in
the European Council and Council of Ministers and nominate commission-
ers, the electoral decision potentially gains another dimension. This further
dimension has the prospective to change some of the dynamics of political
contestation in member states. This idea of another dimension developing is
further discussed in section 3.2.1 below.
3.2 Voting behaviour - spatial models
The models used in the literature reviewed in the previous chapter, were
spatial models of politics. The approach used in this thesis also applies this
logic of space and, therefore, the meaning of such models is briefly discussed
in this section. We begin by defining space and looking at its applicability
to explaining voting behaviour. Two concepts, central to such models, ratio-
nality and utility, are then discussed in greater detail. The section that then
follows takes a closer look at the particular case of the European political
space.
3.2.1 The idea of political space
When we talk about politics, we often, at least implicitly, use the idea of
space. This “we” does not only refer to those dedicating a part of their lives
to the study of politics, as ideas such as left and right or conservative and
liberal are concepts that are also commonly used by the political layman
to put order into and position themselves and others in the complex world
of politics. According to Hinich and Munger [1997], the idea of ordering
political positions along a continuum of left and right goes back to the first
French parliament established after the French Revolution of 1789, but the
idea of political contestation taking place within a space goes all the way
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back to Aristoteles. These concepts are so familiar to us that they appear
to be real, but it is not even necessary to observe that the same terms do
not entail identical content across political systems to know that they are
not real in the sense that they can be observed like an apple that has fallen
from a tree, but are instead inherently constructs that help us to order and
summarise that which we can observe.
The concept of space, as it is used in political science, was originally
taken and adapted from economics. Policy space summarises the idea that
issues can be viewed as a dimension in the form of a set of positions that
are ordered; i.e for example, the ’traditional’ left/right dimension allows one
say that one position is more or less left than another. A policy space then
consists of one or more policy dimensions [Hinich and Munger, 1997]. Spatial
models of voting, thus, assume that there exists such a policy space with one
or more dimensions on each of which actors can be positioned and compared
to one another in terms of this position.
In this approach, elections are viewed much as a market with a demand
and a supply side. On the supply side we generally find political parties
and on the demand side the citizens as voters. Both are acting in the same
space and are trying to reach some kind of optimum with their behaviour.
To bring structure into this market model, some kind of assumptions need
to be made about the rationality of the actors, which is the characteristic in
such models that makes them want to optimise in a given situation. Further
assumptions are made about what is being optimised, usually maximised,
and this most often is described with the term of utility. How these two
concepts are formulated in a model can have far reaching consequences for
the expected outcomes of the model and its predictive power, which is why
both of these are treated separately sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4. But first, we talk
more about this electoral market. Section 3.3 then discusses the particular
case of the European political space.
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3.2.2 The electoral market
The supply side of the electoral market in democratic systems is composed
of the positions that political parties, of which there must be more than
one, offer as a choice for citizens in elections. Political parties are thus, very
central actors in modern representative democracies. According to Mu¨ller
and Strom [1999], the objectives of political parties can be divided into (1)
office seeking where they try to maximise “control over political office”, (2)
policy seeking where they wish to maximise their “impact on public policy”
and (3) vote seeking.
Mu¨ller and Strom [1999] emphasise that these three goals attributed to
political parties cannot necessarily be maximised simultaneously as they may
involve tradeoffs between one another. Furthermore, they note that vote
seeking need not be equated to vote maximisation. Positions parties present
on issues on the political market will be determined, to a large extent, by the
weighing between the three goals in an attempt to achieve an optimal result
under given conditions.
On the demand side, we find the voter who is confronted with the op-
tions on offer by different political parties. The voter, like political parties,
is assumed to have preferences on the different dimensions of the political
space and is, according to this position, capable of ranking the desirability of
potential outcomes. How or according to what criteria will this voter choose?
Spatial theories of voting behaviour offer three alternative explanations for
the behaviour that can be observed for the electorate in democracies [Merrill
and Grofman, 1999]:
1. party identification
2. proximity to the party positions on offer
3. the direction in which policy is affected by choices made
The first model, party identification, comes from one of the first larger
research projects on voting behaviour and is also known as the Michigan
model. In this model, individuals, mainly through socialisation, come to
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identify with a particular party and this is the most important, if not only,
predictor for vote choice in elections. The second, the proximity model, comes
from Anthony Down’s famous and much cited work, An Economic Theory of
Democracy, and still remains to this day the most commonly used approach,
albeit in different variants. In this model, each voter has an ideal point
on each issue dimension and will choose the party situated closest to this
position. The third of these three models, the directional model, posits that
individuals will vote for the party that would shift the status quo closer to
their most preferred situation (see Merrill and Grofman [1999] for a slightly
more detailed summary of these three models).
Because most of the studies reviewed use the proximity model of voting
and because it will be applied in this thesis as well, we concentrate on this one.
“In general, the Downsian proximity model (the traditional spatial model)
specifies that utility – i.e., a voter’s quantitative evaluation of a candidate –
is a declining function of policy distance from voter to candidate. Thus, a
voter’s utility is greatest for a candidate holding identical positions with the
voter on all issues and drops off as the candidate’s spatial position recedes
from that of the voter. The voter is assumed to prefer candidates for whom
he has a higher utility. [Merrill and Grofman, 1999, pgs. 20-21]”
The proximity and directional voting model have in common that they
make certain assumptions about the rationality of the voter and also political
parties, as well as incorporate some kind of concept of utility. These two
issues will be discussed in the next two sections. However, before we proceed
to this discussion, we take a moment to focus on the spatial electoral models
that are most commonly used and were also used in the studies reviewed for
this thesis.
The electoral models applied in the reviewed research were models of
vote choice. In such models, the dependent variable is the actual vote choice
made by individuals in a particular election and these variables are therefore
discrete. Such models are based on rational choice models which originally
stem from economics. Individuals are presented with different alternatives
to each of which they attribute some characteristics. Over these alternatives,
individuals define preference relations by which they rank these. This ranking
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is then often transformed into some type of utility function that serves to
describe this preference ranking.
3.2.3 Rationality
Such models entail some kind of assumption pertaining to the type of ra-
tionality the actors in the model are thought to exhibit. Rationality in this
context refers to the preferences of individuals [Schofield, 2008] and their ac-
tions relative to these preferences [Spohn, 2002]. The idea of rationality has
been discussed and reviewed so much since its initial conception in about the
eighteenth century, that it could even be viewed as a research field in its own
right. There is obviously no way that this small section can do justice to this
debate. There exists a myriad of different theories behind the term of ratio-
nality, alone in economics. We shall not dwell on these here (see Blume and
Easely [2008] for an overview). Instead, we restrict ourselves to individual
rationality as the voting models try to explain individual behaviour and dis-
cuss two different ideas of rationality prevalent in the social and behavioural5
sciences.
“The term “rational” denotes behaviour that is appropriate to specified
goals in the context of a given situation. Simon [1985, pg.294]” Simon, to
whom the concept of bounded rationality is usually attributed, discerns be-
tween two ideas of rationality to which we alluded to in the introductory
paragraph of this section. The first, substantive rationality, refers to a situa-
tion in which solely the objectives of and the restrictions on an individual are
considered. The individual is rational if the outcome optimises her situation,
but no consideration is taken of the other characteristics of this individual.
In other words, the action can be judged as rational if the individual, under
given specifications of objectives and constraints, chooses the ’objectively’
best outcome.
Even though this concept of rationality provides for very neat theoretical
models, it has been the object of much criticism for a long time. The main
problem that has been found with it has been empirical. Humans in the real
5The term behavioural used here, as it is in the social sciences, is not the same as when
in it is used in psychology in the form of behaviouralism (see Simon [1985]).
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world just do not appear to function according to this idea of rationality.
The most famous objection has been that it is continuously found that in-
dividuals behave differently when a problem is framed in alternative ways.
In particular, in situations involving risk it has been found that people’s ac-
tions depend on whether they see the potential outcomes as gains or losses
[Quattrone and Tversky, 1988].
The second idea of rationality Simon [1985] terms procedural or bounded
rationality. In his own words, “[t]o derive the procedurally or boundedly
rational choice in a situation, we must know the choosing organism’s goals,
the information and conceptualization it has of the situation, and its abilities
to draw inferences from the information it possesses. We need know nothing
about the objective situation in which the organism finds itself, except in-
sofar as the situation influences the subjective representation. [Simon, 1985,
pg.295]”
3.2.4 Utility
The concept of utility plays a central role in voting models, much like in
any rational choice model. However, different concepts of utility exist across
disciplines and different models use different types of measures for utility.
Further, there are some issues with regards to the relationship between utility
and choice in voting models in particular. As the different applications of
these in models have weighty consequences, they merit a more detailed, even
if not comprehensive, treatment. The discussion of these is presented in this
section. The different concepts and measures of utility will be presented
very briefly, but quite a bit more time will be spent on the relationship
between utility and choice as this will be important for the formulation of
the theoretical framework of this thesis, particular with regards to the choice
of the dependent variable.
Different concepts of utility
Something that is rarely discussed and that took me a long time to find
out, is that different academic traditions apply different concepts of util-
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ity. Familiarity with only one of the concepts can lead to great confusion
when confronted with the term as it is applied in another field. Merely in
a footnote, van der Eijk et al. [2006], explain that one needs to differentiate
between the concept as it is used in economics and its usage in psychology,
consumer studies and electoral research.
In the economic tradition, particularly in game theory, the idea of “ex-
pected utility” is most commonly applied. Expected utility pays attention to
uncertainty and risk that may be present in a given situation. An individual
multiplies the utility she would enjoy from something if it would certainly
occur with an objective or, most often, subjective probability to derive the
expected utility of an outcome. The individual then maximises over the ex-
pected utility to choose the available action that would lead to the highest
possible expected utility.
Seeing that electoral research often applies game theoretic concepts, it
can then be particularly confusing if the idea of utility that is being used is
not explicitly defined and left to the reader to infer. Unfortunately this is
often the case. Also, because elections most certainly present situations with
uncertainty, it is all the more confusing that this concept is not applied.
According to van der Eijk et al. [2006], in the traditions “individual choice
theory” taken from psychology, utility and choice options are one and the
same. The utility of different choice options integrate strategic and prob-
abilistic considerations. In electoral studies political parties are viewed as
providing some kind of utility to individuals.
Different measures of utility
Utility has to be measured in order for one to be able to work with it. For
this, one needs to differentiate between cardinal and ordinal utilities. Ordinal
utility is solely a ranking of different options. In other words, ordinal utilities
only measure if one option is better than another. The cardinal utilities
approach goes further than this, in that it also provides information on how
much better one option is than another. That is to say, that for cardinal
utility a difference of say 5 units between two alternatives is greater than
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a difference of 2 units; this is not so for ordinal utility. I have seen the
claim made in some literature that cardinal utility exists when utility can
be displayed with a utility function of metric quality (e.g.: van der Eijk
et al. [2006]). This assertion is incorrect as alternative options compared
with ordinal utility can be and are usually mapped into the real numbers.
The difference between the two utility functions stemming from ordinal and
cardinal utility is their posterior interpretation.
It is for good reason that economics has largely divorced itself from any
use of cardinal utility. Ordinal utility is applied whereby the utility function
is used in optimisation problem subject to numerous constraints, from which
individual demand is derived. Individual demand is then aggregated across
individuals, but one never aggregates or compares the utility that individuals
accord to something. The claim that there is little justification for comparing
the magnitude of utility difference for an individual and more particularly
across individuals lies at the base of the choice for ordinal utility.
Nevertheless, there are also arguments for cardinal utilities in certain
contexts. Allais [1991] argues that despite the fact that “a complete theory
of general economic equilibrium and maximum efficiency” is possible with-
out cardinal utility, that this concept is absolutely indispensable for certain
research questions in economics and elsewhere and that it is possible to con-
struct such measures with the right survey questions (see also Camacho [1979]
and Camacho [1980] for a discussion). Voting models, particular their em-
pirical application, need a cardinal concept of utility for them to make sense.
In the absence of this concept, it would not be possible to run statistical
analyses with utilities as dependent or independent variables.
Utility and choice
In the preceding discussions of different voting models and utility, a connec-
tion between utility and choice was made. This connection is very central to
rational choice models, because generally such models assume that individu-
als are trying to optimise (maximise) their utility by the choices they make.
The connection between the two concepts is what explains individual and,
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as result, collective behaviour.
Naturally, voting models of the kind that we have discussed, make pre-
cisely such a connection between utility and choice. However, there are some
claims made in rational models of voting that I have difficulty with. It is
claimed that individuals vote for parties that will provide them the highest
level of utility. This does indeed make sense, but the problem in proximity
models is that the utility of a political party for an individual is equated
to the inverse of the distance between the most preferred policy position
of an individual and that of a party. This is in principle problematic, but
even more so if one is confronted with a multi-dimensional political space. If
we take a two dimensional policy space, where parties and individuals have
positions on both of the two dimensions, we need to look at the total dis-
tance between an individual’s and a party’s position. Yet, it does not appear
strange to claim that one of the two dimensions may be more important to
an individual than the other, in which case the interpretation of this distance
in two dimensional space becomes rather difficult.
It would make more sense to view the policy distance between individuals
and parties on different dimensions as part of that which explains the utility
individuals accord to a party. One can easily come up with numerous other
factors that may influence the utility individuals accord to political parties;
the personality or good looks of individual party candidates or the level of
competence one accords to a party in relation to another are just a few
examples that could affect the utility attached to a party (see also Burden
[1997]).
Proximity models have, despite this, fared rather well in explaining voting
behaviour and this is probably because the proximity concept does capture
one of the most important determinants of party utility. However, from a
theoretical perspective they do appear a little more clumsy than from an
empirical one. As van der Eijk et al. [2006, pg. 426] put it, voting models
tend to fail to “explicitly distinguish between choice on the one hand, and
the attractiveness of parties and candidates as options for choice.”
The explanations for choice presented do appear plausible plausible when
looking at two-party systems of democracy such as the United States or Great
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Britain. Most models, were indeed designed to explain voting behaviour in
elections in the former of these two countries. In such situations utility and
choice my be compounded in such a manner without fear of detrimental
consequences. In the case where the choice to be made is really only one
between two options the outcome of an election can be presented as an ex-
pected utility. This no longer holds in the case of multi-party democracies
with numerous smaller parties, as individuals vote for parties where they
have good reason to assume that despite them succeeding in securing some
seats in parliament will not make it into the next cabinet. The question
then arises why people vote for such parties or to formulate it more starkly
why multi-party democracies exist at all. This is relevant as the majority of
countries in Europe are multi-party democracies.
The next question that comes up is why people vote at all, regardless of
for which party or whether this be in a two or multi-party system. In fact,
some game theoretical models of voting conclude that it is irrational to vote.
As a mere example, we look at the expected weight of the individual votes for
the Austrian parliamentary elections in 2006 and 2008. In the former year
6.107.892 individuals were eligible to vote and in the latter 6.333.1096. We
calculate the weights for each individual should each eligible voter make the
trip to the urns with 1
eligiblevoters
, which yields 0, 000000164 and 0, 000000158
for the years 2006 and 2008 respectively. With Austria being a rather small
country with a current population of about 8, 4 million7, the weight of each
individual vote will be larger than in many other countries with larger pop-
ulations. Nevertheless, the voter turnout in Austria was slightly over 78% in
both years8.
These very small numbers for the expected weight of an individual vote
do not give one the idea that one should should expect turnout in such large
6Source: Bundesministerium fu¨r Inneres http://www.bmi.gv.at/cms/BMI_wahlen/
nationalrat/start.aspx, accessed 18.12.2011. These figures include Austrian citizens
living outside of Austria that are eligible to vote.
7Source: Statisikik Austria http://www.statistik.at/web_de/presse/055278, ac-
cessed 18.12.2011. This figure includes individuals living in Austria without Austrian
citizenship.
8Source: Bundesministerium fu¨r Inneres http://www.bmi.gv.at/cms/BMI_wahlen/
nationalrat/start.aspx, accessed 18.12.2011.
32
numbers, yet this is what one sees. This is at least as much a problem of
the directional model of voting as of the proximity model, if not even more
so. The directional model directly integrates the assumption that citizens
vote with the idea that their vote can or may actually influence the direction
that policy will take relative to the status quo. Therefore, there must be
something else that motivates people to go to the urns (for example, duty,
see: Blais [2000]).
To a certain extent, the choice of the dependent variable used in this
thesis avoids this problem (see section 5.3.1), because we are not trying to
explain actual vote choice. However, it does not avoid this problem entirely
as the dependent variable measures the attractiveness of political parties as
an option for vote choice and thus does imply to a certain extent that one
expects that individuals do on average seriously consider voting in elections
at some point in time or another.
From the preceding discussion, we see that the manner in which the
concept of utility is applied in voting models, at least in my view, is not
entirely unproblematic. Most of the problems arise in the situation where
vote choice is used as the dependent variable and then at the same time
making no distinction between attractiveness of options for choice and the
actual choice. If one views decision problems as a two step process, where
in a first instance individuals rank options (this is portrayed in the utility
function) and in the second, they make decisions based on this, one must
distinguish between the two. In short, the manner in which most voting
models are applied collapses the two steps into one.
3.3 The European Political Space
This section takes a closer look at the nature of the European political
space. The idea of a political space, in general, was already discussed and
defined in section 3.2.1. Political scientists studying voting behaviour or,
more generally, political contestation using this idea of political space, have
asked how best to describe the political space in which actors act; in other
words, whether domestic politics is best described along the one-dimensional
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left/right space or is two or even more dimensional and this is just as rel-
evant for the case of Europe in the context that we are looking at it here.
The discussions around this could even be summarised by the question of
whether there is actually such a thing as European political space.
The discussion in this section and analyses in later chapters are con-
strained by the requirements of the research questions. Analysing the nature
of political spaces can lead one to the study of the substantive content of
the individual dimensions of spaces across political systems (see for exam-
ple Piurko et al. [forthcoming]) or a lengthy discussion of what the relevant
areas of political contestations are. Despite these issues being immensely
interesting, the ensuing discussion limits itself to the question of whether
domestic left/right and European integration dimensions span a one or two
dimnensionsal space.
As the European Union member states are nation states that are all
democratic, and most of them have been for quite some time, it can be
assumed that the classic left-right dimension existed before their accession
to the European Union or its predecessors. The question of whether there
is such a thing as a European political space then implies the question of
whether European integration is an issue that can be subsumed into this
’old’ dimension or brings with it a further political dimension that is, at
least to some extent, independent of it.
Part of the discussion on the ’permissive consensus’ that was thought
to exist in the European Union for a while, has been the idea that citizens
exhibit no real or systematic preferences on the issue of integration [Gabel
and Andersen, 2002]. The ’democratic deficit’ came to be, also – though not
only –, because citizens began to exhibit exactly such preferences. Because
manifest preferences began to develop on the part of citizens, the dimension
of European integration came into existence where it had not been before,
namely in domestic political contestation, at least in a nascent form. This
is exactly what we were making reference to in section 3.1, when we said
that the structure of the European polity contains the potential for another
dimension of contestation. However, the institutional mechanism alone is
insufficient. As we outlined, this dimension must also be perceived on the
34
part of citizens: in such a way that they have manifest preferences on the
issues it contains in order for us to be able to speak of a European political
space. We take another look at this in the section outlining the theoretical
framework of this thesis and then test for this empirically in section 5.4.3.
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4 Theoretical Framework of the Thesis
This section presents the theoretical framework of the thesis. To this end, it
draws on section 4 and the literature reviewed in section 2 as well as further
literature.
4.1 Approach to Representation
As Thomassen and Schmitt [1997] rightly state “(t)he so-called democratic
deficit is a meaningless phrase as long as one does not specify what one’s nor-
mative views on the European Union are. (pg.166)” However, the approach
of this thesis is such that it is not required to take a normative position on
this and this shall also not be done. As we are looking at the way in which, if
at all, preferences on European integration affect the attitude of individuals
towards individual political parties, it is not required that a position is taken
on whether this should be the case or not. In order to answer the research
questions it is also not necessary to take a position on whether the institu-
tional mechanisms that were in place at the points in time under inspection
are good or bad or whether or not they should be modified and if, how.
At the basis of this framework is the previously discussed paths of repre-
sentation in the European Union. The thesis, and thus this framework, only
pays attention to the national level of representation. That it to say, only
national elections are looked at in relation to the European integration issue
dimension.
As the data being used (see section 5.1) contains only three years between
1999 and 2009, we are forced to disregard the transition from the ’permissive
consensus’ to the ’democratic crisis’ and can only look at potential changes to
the ’legitimacy crisis’ after the failed referenda to the Constitutional Treaty
in France and the Netherlands. Thus, we can only try to see if we can
find evidence of any change in the importance of attitudes on European
integration at this point in time and not any earlier.
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4.2 Electoral supply and demand
Like the majority of the work that has been made in this area of political
science, the literature reviewed and the theory discussed in the previous
section, the theoretical framework of this thesis is one that follows the rational
choice perspective. Thus, the idea of an electoral market, with a supply and
demand side of that which is put on offer by political parties and demanded by
the electorate in a common political space, forms the basis of the theoretical
frame. The assumptions made with respect to these two sets of actors is
discussed in sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, and the two sides of this market are
connected within a proximity model in section 4.2.3.
4.2.1 Supply: political parties
Political parties, as the ”vehicles of political representation [Mu¨ller and Strom,
1999]”, are the central actor on the supply side. The focus of the thesis is,
however, more on the demand side of the voters and therefore, some strongly
simplifying assumptions are made about this set of actors. This is done for
analytic purposes, in order to keep the model parsimonious and should not
have an effect on the outcomes of the empirical analysis.
First, it is assumed that political parties are unitary actors. This implies
that political parties can be viewed as one actor that has preferences, posi-
tions and is capable of making decisions. How these positions and preferences
or decisions are arrived at will not be our concern. One stark example suffices
to show that this is a very simplifying assumption. The French Socialist Party
was divided on diametrically opposed during the campaign surrounding the
European constitutional treaty to such an extent that many commentators
thought a scission to be an entirely possible scenario. Yet, such extreme cases
are not the norm and trying to include the internal politics of political parties
into the model used in this thesis would make everything wildly complicated
and that unnecessarily so.
The second assumption made about political parties is that they are try-
ing to optimise vote gain. Following again, Mu¨ller and Strom [1999] optimis-
ing vote gain need not necessarily be equated to vote maximisation as this
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can conflict with other objectives political parties may have. But as votes are
a prerequisite for some other objectives, this assumption will be central to
the model in that we assume that parties position themselves along different
dimensions in the political space with the attempt to attract as one of the
main motivations for a particular choice of position.
4.2.2 Demand: Voters
On the other side of the electoral market we find the electorate. About these,
we must also make some simplifying assumptions.
Voters are assumed to be boundedly rational individuals. This implies
that we do not assume that individuals are perfectly informed and that they
thus do not necessarily hold the views that an ’objective’ expert would have.
No assumptions are made as to how voters come by their positions on the
different dimensions as this has no effective bearing on the analysis. In other
words, whether voters follow their preferred political parties (cue taking or
whether they come to their positions via experience and the information they
collect on an issue (policy mood) is left as an open question.
4.2.3 Connecting demand and supply: proximity
The demand and supply side discussed in the previous section are seen to
come together most particularly on the day(s) of an election. Naturally, the
positions on both sides of political parties and individuals will be constructed
during the times between elections and there are numerous ways and direc-
tions in which this can take place, but this is not the concern of the research
questions in this thesis. Thus, these mechanisms, however they may function,
are not at all considered and the positions on the dimensions of the political
space are taken for granted.
In section 3.2.2, three spatial models were presented of how this connec-
tion between the demand and supply side may take place. These were the
1) party identification, 2) proximity and 3) directional models. Here, the
second of the three, the proximity model will be used. The first model would
be of little use for the theoretical questions. It could, of course, be said that
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party identification could change over time and that this could be influenced
by issues surrounding European unification, but this would go beyond what
we are trying to do here and also does not fit the theory behind this model
too well. It then remains to argue the choice between the second and third
options.
The first reason for choosing the proximity model is that it has been
shown to work well empirically, albeit not always justified empirically in the
context of voting models. Secondly, much of the literature reviewed uses
this approach and as these studies serve as a point of reference for analysing
the results in section 6 it makes more sense to use the same model. Third,
despite the theory behind the two models being quite different, there is little
evidence that the two models lead to significantly different results [Lewis and
King, 1999].
4.2.4 Connecting demand and supply: attractiveness for choice
It must be emphasised again that, unlike the studies that were reviewed
which tried to explain the impact of European integration on vote choice,
that which will be explained in this thesis is attractiveness of political parties
as options for vote choice.
4.2.5 Location of the electoral market: European political space
In section 3.3, the idea of a European political space was discussed. This
European political space potentially entails two dimensions; the domestic
left/right dimension and the European integration dimension. On the one
hand, the dimensionality of this space, which is termed the European political
space in line with [Marks and Steenbergen, 2002], will determine the methods
that are applicable to the research question or may even render the research
question entirely obsolete with the methods proposed for use in this thesis9.
On the other hand, despite the emerging discussions in the literature that
9I am grateful for a comment made in the Diplomanden/Dissertanten Konversatorium
of Prof. Wolfgang C. Mu¨ller at the University of Vienna, which made me realise that
one must differentiate between a question not being answerable by certain methods and a
question being irrelevant in its entirety.
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domestic political contestation may not best be captured by the left/right
dimension alone [Thomassen, forthcoming 2012], I will restrict myself only
to positions on the left/right scale with regards to the domestic dimension.
We therefore posit, that there exists a European political space which is
either one or two dimension. In the case where it is one dimensional, the
left/right dimension captures all issues of relevance for political contestation
and in the case where it is two dimensional there is another dimension, the
European integration dimension, that captures an independent set of issues
pertaining to the European Union. Whatever the nature of this space is,
we assume that all citizens and all political parties act in this space, which
means there exists only one space which is the same for all actors involved on
both the demand and supply sides. We investigate the nature of the political
space in section 5.4.3.
Figure 2: Two stage model of electoral choice
Determinants of electoral
utility (including strategic
considerations)
U1
U2
U3
Uk
First stage
utility function
Second stage
decision rule
Electoral utilities
(one for each party)
Party
Choice
Source: reproduced from van der Eijk et al. [2006]
4.3 Defining the necessary conditions
In the previous sections certain conditions kept on appearing that were
termed as requirements for EU issue voting to take place. We will term these
necessary conditions. First, we define the concept of a necessary condition
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and then summarise and discuss the necessary conditions for EU issue voting
that we derived from the literature review and the theoretical discussions.
Definition: Necessary Condition.
”A (...) circumstance in whose absence the event in question
cannot occur.”
Clark [2008]
In other words, a necessary condition is something that is required to
be present in order for an event to occur. Should this condition be absent
the event or effect cannot occur, but it will not necessarily always occur in
the presence of a necessary condition. Figure 3 visualises this concept. A
condition that always causes an effect to occur is usually termed a sufficient
condition. None of the necessary conditions we derived is also a sufficient
condition, which implies that on the one hand their presence is required for,
but on the other does not necessarily entail that EU issue voting will occur
as a consequence.
Demand Side. Citizens as potential voters together with their policy pref-
erences constitute the demand side of the electoral market. We have already
specified the assumptions we make with regards to the electorate as actors.
Following the literature reviewed, we require that individual citizens actually
have ’real’ or ’manifest’ preferences on European integration. It goes without
saying that if individuals were to have no preferences on this dimension we
could not expect that any decisions they make on the electoral market will
be influenced by this.
As a further necessary condition on the demand side, we require that cit-
izens not only hold ’real’ preferences, but also that these vary across them.
Would all individuals occupy approximately the same position on this di-
mension, to speak of political contestation would not be meaningful.
For the left/right dimension we simply assume that these two conditions
hold and take this for granted without looking further at it. This has the
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analytic advantage that the left/right dimension can act as a point of refer-
ence for later empirical analyses. This is precisely what we will do when we
test for this necessary condition later.
Supply Side. The supply side is composed of the positions of political
parties on the relevant issue dimensions. We also list two necessary conditions
on political parties. The first two are analogous to the those of citizens on
the demand side. Firstly, we need political parties to have positions on the
European integration dimension and secondly, that there is some kind of
variance across parties with respect to these positions. One of the problems
that was found by numerous authors (for example van der Eijk et al. [2006]) in
reference to the ’democratic deficit’ of the European Union was that political
parties do not offer much choice on this dimension. European integration can
obviously have no effect in national elections if political parties do not offer
different options for choice to the electorate.
Once again, we assume that these conditions hold for political parties on
the left/right dimension and use this dimension as a reference point to draw
conclusions about the European integration dimension later.
European Political Space. In the discussion of the European political
space in sections 3.3 and 4.2.5, we argued that for the questions posed in
this thesis, a European political space must exist and that, furthermore,
this space should be two-dimensional. In other words, we need to have two
dimensions, one being the domestic left/right dimension and the other the
European integration dimension and it should not be the case that the two
dimensions can subsumed into one, but that they are to a certain extent
independent of one another.
Salience. Salience of an issue, here, simply refers to the importance of
an issue. If an issue is salient, it means that it is considered important to
those for whom it is salient. As a last necessary condition, we require the
that the European integration integration be salient for the electorate. An
effect of European integration on the probability of an individual to vote for
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a political party can only be expected if citizens think the issue sufficiently
important, even if they have manifest preferences in this regard, for them to
care about the position of a party on the issue.
Figure 3: Necessary Condition
necessary
condition
effect
Source: reconstructed from Clark [2008]
Table 1 summarises the necessary conditions. All necessary conditions
listed in this table are subjected to a-priori tests in section 5.4, with the
exception of the requirement for salience of the issue of European integration.
Salience of the European integration issue will be treated as a theoretical
assumption, particularly because it is difficult to test empirically with the
data being used in this thesis.
In essence, the theoretical model requires all necessary conditions to hold
in order for the dependent variable to be potentially affected by the distance
between the position an individual holds on the EU integration dimension
and the position of a party.
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Table 1: Necessary Conditions for EU issue voting
Necessary Conditions:
Supply side:
1a. citizens have manifest preferences about Eu-
ropean integration
1b. preferences about European integration vary
across citizens
Demand side:
2a. political parties have positions on the issue
of European integration
2b. positions on the issue of European integra-
tion must vary across political parties
Political space:
3. left/right and European integration dimen-
sions are independent for citizens
Salience:
4. European integration is a salient issue for cit-
izens
4.4 Rationality, utility and choice
Rationality. In section 3.2.3 two concepts of rationality, substantive and
proced ural or bounded rationality were briefly discussed. In this thesis, we
assume that the actors, both political parties and citizens as potential voters,
are boundedly rational. This implies that these actors inform themselves in
a cost effective manner on those issues they deem as important, but are not
fully informed on all elements of a topic. As will be discussed in section
5.3.3, this is the basis for certain choices made with regards to the data to
answer the research questions. The research questions are formulated in such
a way that it makes more sense to view the situation from the perspective of
citizens instead of the perspective of analysts. General public opinion does on
occasion, perhaps even often, deviate from expert opinion. Hence, we apply
data from mass surveys. This, however, does not require one to assume that
the opinion of the masses is irrational. Indeed, if we were to so this, a model
vested in a rational choice approach as it is applied here would fall apart in
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its entirety. The assumption of bounded rationality, which is unrelated to
the idea of irrationality, nicely fits our situation.
Utility and choice. The theoretical framework of the thesis stays in line
with the assumptions made about utility in electoral models. Thus, it is
assumed that political parties provide voters with utility. It is the potential
impact of the European integration issue dimension on this utility that we
are trying to look for.
In section 3.2.4 we spent much time on discussing the connection between
utility and choice. It is with this connection that the thesis deviates from
usual voting models that have been applied in the literature. Figure 2 depicts
the two stage model of electoral choice for an individual that lies at the base
of the theoretical model we are going to apply. We assume that in a first stage
the electoral utility of a political party is determined by a number of factors
and that, in a second step, some choice rule determines that actual choice
then made in an election. We further assume that the electoral utilities
of parties are an important factor in determining the vote choices of the
electorate, but not the only. In the previous chapter, I objected to the way
in which utility and choice are linked in the majority of voting models, but
made no real attempt to offer an alternative. Because this thesis only tries
to understand the electoral utility of political parties and not vote choice,
such a theoretical alternative is not required for the thesis. In other words,
we try only to contribute to the understanding of the first of the two steps
in this electoral choice model.
By necessity, we assume that the utility attached to political parties is
cardinal. This means that, on the one hand, the utility provided by a party
to one individual can be compared to the utility that this party provides to
another individual. In other words, we can say that the utility of one party
is higher for one person than for another. In doing this, we can aggregate
utilities across individuals and study what impacts on or explains changes
in utility for political parties. The statistical models we will apply in the
empirical analysis would make little sense were we not to use cardinal utilities.
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4.5 Summary of the theoretical framework
The final section of this section briefly summarises the main points of the
theoretical framework to be applied in this thesis.
• The model applied is a rational choice model of political contestation
treated as an electoral market.
• At the basis of the model is a two–step electoral decision model, of
which only the first step is integrated into the model.
• The electoral market consists of the supply side of issue positions on
offer by political parties and the demand side of the voters who have
most preferred positions on the same issues.
• Political contestation takes place within a political space that is the
same for all actors.
• Political parties are assumed to be unitary actors that attempt to op-
timise vote gain.
• Voters and political parties are boundedly rational.
• Measures of cardinal utility are applied.
• Proximity on issue dimensions is claimed to be an important explana-
tory factor for the utility political parties present for individuals.
• Five necessary conditions pertaining to the demand and supply sides
of the electoral market and the European political space must hold in
order for EU issue voting to be able to take place.
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5 Data and Method
This chapter outlines the model and methods that will be used in the empir-
ical analysis in section 6. However, as some empirical questions need to be
resolved before the statistical methods can be fully determined, this chapter
also includes some prior empirical analyses. These prior empirical analyses
pertain to the necessary conditions for the model that were derived in section
4.3. These results from this will then determine, in part, the choice of the
statistical methods.
The chapter begins with a description of the data that will be used both
in the preliminary empirical analyses and the empirical testing of the theo-
retical model later in section 6 and the details of the case selection. Section
5.3 operationalises the research questions, which entails a more detailed de-
scription of and choice motivation of the dependent variable, the derivation
of the hypotheses from the research questions and an illustration of the sta-
tistical models that will be applied to test the hypotheses. This is followed
by empirical tests of the necessary conditions.
5.1 Data
As the main source of data, this thesis will be using the European Election
Study (EES)10 data [EES, 2009]. The EES has been conducted since 1979 in
the member states of the European Union in the years of European Parlia-
mentary (EP) elections. The study made with representative questionnaires
in each country, is an attempt to gage the perceptions and preferences of citi-
zens about issues of the European Union as well as attitudes on the domestic
level, but also includes an analysis of party manifestos in the framework of
the Euromaifestos project. The data from the Euromanifesto project will
not be used; solely the EES surveys will be applied.
There are obvious shortcomings that come hand in hand with using this
10I am very grateful to Guido Tiemann and his team at the Institute for Advanced
Studies (IHS) in Vienna for allowing me to use a more finely formatted version of the EES
data set constructed for the FWF Project “Political Behaviour and Political Preferences
in the European Political Space”.
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data for the research questions. The respondents are replying to the ques-
tionnaire at a point in time that, with the exception of Luxembourg, does
generally not coincide with the electoral campaigns for national parliamen-
tary elections and the research questions do make reference to national elec-
tions. This can then produce a response bias. This problem is circumvented
by the choice of the dependent variable which is discussed in greater detail
later in this chapter (see section 5.3.1). However, the data set has a num-
ber of advantages as well. Firstly, the questions across countries are the
same. Secondly, the data that is available is already available without the
requirement of recoding different value levels.
Although the focus of the surveys is on EP elections, the questionnaires
includes not only questions on the positioning of individuals and their percep-
tions of party positions on scales on the left/right and European integration
dimensions, but also some sociodemographic questions that lend themselves
well as control variables in the analyses. Three survey waves, those of the
years 1999, 2004 and 2009 will be used.
5.2 Case selection
Twelve of the fifteen EU15 countries will be included in the analysis. Bel-
gium, Italy and Sweden are excluded from the analysis. Belgium presents it-
self as a complicated case because of the deep divisions between Flanders and
Wallonia, where the language and cultural differences also translate them-
selves into the political party landscape with different political parties oper-
ating in the two different areas. Some authors treat Belgium as two cases,
however, I choose not to do this in this thesis as the case of the (also con-
stitutionally) bilingual capital Brussels is not resolved by this method. The
divides that cut across Belgium are not mirrored in Brussels, and the inhab-
itants Brussels make up about 10 percent of the Belgian population. Italy
is excluded because of its unstable political party landscape. Italy is charac-
terised by a much larger than average number of political parties and these
parties tend not to be marked by stability over time. Sweden is left out of
the analyses due to some data anomalies that are present for this country in
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the EES surveys. These issues would have to be resolved for it to make sense
to include Sweden.
The twelve newer member states of the European Union are excluded for
two reasons. Firstly, the accession of these countries being relatively recent,
the newer member states do not present good cases for looking at changes
over time. Secondly, I am in possession of an insufficient amount of knowledge
about these countries to make their inclusion in my analyses legitimate.
Thus, the empirical analysis will include all EU15 countries with the
exceptions of Belgium, Italy and Sweden. In total this makes thirteen cases
that will be analysed, whereby a case is defined here as a country across a
particular time span. Thus, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Luxembourg,
Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Great Britain, Austria and
Finland will be looked at. The EES surveys only began to ask placement
questions on a European integration scale in the survey of 1999. As a result,
we are restricted to three surveys, namely those from 1999, 2004 and 2009.
For each country, to be able to answer the research questions, analyses will
be run for each political party in a country and for the country as a whole
separately for the survey years.
5.3 Operationalising the Research Questions
This section operationalises the research questions outlined in the introduc-
tion and relates them to the theoretical framework constructed in section 4.
In a first instance, the choice of the dependent variable, the propensity to
vote (PTV) is discussed. Second, testable hypotheses for the four research
questions are designed. Third, these hypotheses are discussed in greater de-
tail and translated into statistical models to which the EES data will be
applied.
5.3.1 The dependent variable
Throughout, it was emphasised that the dependent variable used for the
model in this thesis shall not be vote choice. Instead of vote choice, the
propensity to vote (PTV) for a particular political party is the variable that
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is to be explained. This subsection serves to present the reasons behind this
choice.
The idea of the PTV, particularly as a dependent variable for voting
models, was first proposed by van der Eijk et al. [2006]. The PTV is included
in the EES surveys and is a respondent’s answer to the following question
that is asked in the EES survey for all political parties in a particular country:
We have a number of parties in [country] each of which would like to
get your vote. How probable is it that you will ever vote for the following
parties? Please specify your views on a 10-point-scale where 1 means “not at
all probable” and 10 means “very probable”. If you think of [Party x]: what
mark out of ten best describes how probable it is that you will ever vote for
[Party x]?
The PTV is presented by van der Eijk et al. [2006] as a direct measure
of electoral utility. Unlike the most commonly used dependent variable for
spatial electoral models of vote choice, the PTV measures how attractive
parties are for vote choice. Although the two concepts are strongly related,
they are fundamentally different. Choice is the outcome of an action, whereas
the attractiveness of parties measures something that is more closely related
to a preference ranking that will then be used with the application of a choice
rule to make a choice.
There are three main, more technical, advantages to using the PTV in-
stead of vote choice or vote intent as the dependent variable. Firstly, it is
easier to capture information with regard to small parties that do not receive
many votes in national elections. If few people voted for or intend to vote for
a particular party, also few of these individuals will be included in a survey.
This puts one in the situation of a small n problem and one is prevented
from really studying the effects pertaining to these parties van der Eijk et al.
[2006]. With too few relevant respondents, research questions 2 and 3 could
probably not be studied well with the methods used in this thesis. These
two questions make reference to extremist parties on the left/right and EU
integration dimensions and in many cases this will involve small parties.
50
Secondly, it will be possible to include non–voters that respondent in the
surveys in the analyses. Looking at vote choice requires that an individual
actually voted or intends to vote in the next election. It has been found that
not all too many non–voters in one election are constant non–voters [Braud,
2004]. As numerous individuals that did not vote in the last or do not in-
tend to vote in the next national election, are still potential voters in future
elections, the information included in their responses may be relevant and,
therefore, there is no reason not to include them. Furthermore, there is a
tendency for surveys to be plagued by a so called ’vote overreporting’ prob-
lem, whereby the number of people who report having voted in an election
when responding to questions in a mass survey lies significantly above the
actually observed turnout levels. Selb and Munzert [2011] site two different
causes for this overreporting bias. First, voters that actually did vote in
an election may be overrepresented due to disproportionate self–selection of
such individuals, which may on average be more politically interested than
the average non–voter. Braud [2004], however, notes that non–voters can
also include individuals that are politically interested, but feel that none of
the options presented to them can incite them to vote. Including such in-
dividuals in the study can be interesting as the research questions refer to
the potential advantages that political parties can get from EU integration
issue positions and such individuals could become voters in future elections.
In sum, voters and politically interested non–voters may be more willing to
participate in an electoral studies survey. This leads to a selection bias.
The second cause the authors identify is misreporting. This occurs when
non–voters report to have voted or their intent to vote in an election, presum-
ably due to ideas of social desirability or other ideas held by an individual.
This leads to a misclassification bias. Using the PTV measure as the de-
pendent variable means that this particular misclassification bias, a problem
inherent to the large majority of mass surveys [Selb and Munzert, 2011], can
be entirely avoided. However, the selection bias cannot, nor can any other
misclassification biases regarding the PTV or any other used variables be
avoided.
A third advantage of the choice of the PTV as the dependent variable
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presents itself in the fact that normal OLS can be used in the statistical
analyses and thus complex conditional logit and multinomial logit methods
can be avoided. Most of the literature applying vote choice models make
use of such methods and they are rather complicated and not without their
problems [McFadden, 1974].
5.3.2 Hypotheses
In what follows, testable hypotheses relating to the four research questions
are stated.
Hypothesis 1 (H1): European integration impacts on the attractiveness of
political parties for citizens.
The issue of European integration affects the way in which individuals
view parties. That is to say, that how much an individual likes a
party can be and is affected in some cases by the position a party
takes on the issue of European integration. The corresponding null
hypothesis states that the issue of European integration does not affect
the preferences individuals have over parties at all. Thus, in order to
be able to reject the null hypothesis we require solely a single case of
one party at one point in time where it can be shown that European
integration preferences of individuals in relation to the position of this
party has an effect on its popularity. An outcome where H1 can be
thought to hold for only one case would not be very interesting or
informative, but in light of the results in the literature reviewed in
section 2 and the preceding theoretical discussion that an effect will be
found for a larger number of parties.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The importance of the European integration issue for
the attractiveness of parties for citizens has increased over time.
As was discussed in the introductory chapter to this thesis as well as
in section 2, there is much evidence at least since the early nineties the
permissive consensus with regards to European integration had largely
been eroded and citizens had begun to view European integration much
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more as an issue that was of relevance to themselves and more generally
as factor in domestic political contestation. Thus, it can be assumed
that how political parties, as primordial actors in the democratic sys-
tem, are viewed by citizens will be increasingly affected over time by
the positions parties and individuals take on European integration.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Extreme parties profit more from the European inte-
gration issue than moderate parties.
Whether parties are considered as extreme or moderate is determined
by their positions on the left/right scale. Both parties situated at the
left and right extremities of this spectrum are regarded as extreme.
Following de Vries [2007], extreme parties are defined as those whose
position lies one standard deviation more or less away from the party
average on the left/right scale (see section 5.3.3). Extreme parties also
tend to be smaller parties than moderate parties and, as discussed in
earlier sections, will have more interest in a new political dimension.
As Mair [2000] notes, some extreme parties that also tend to be ant-
integrationist do manage to garner a significant amount of the votes
in national elections where he mentions the Austrian Freedom Party,
the French National Front and the Swedish Left Party. Thus, a smaller
average vote share for extremist parties does not render these irrelevant.
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Anti-integration positions have a greater impact on
individual preferences over parties than pro-integration positions.
The political parties in European national governments tend not oc-
cupy anti-integrationist positions and are also the political parties most
directly involved in the European integration process. As a result, in
most cases they will not be seen as having an anti-integrationist posi-
tion by the general public. Individuals that see European integration
as largely undesirably will place greater importance on the issue when
looking at political parties than those that see European integration in
a more positive light.
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5.3.3 The statistical model and variable choice
All hypotheses are tested according to some form of the following equation11:
PTVjt = βj,0t + βj,1td(lrj) + βj,2td(euj) + βj,3t−j,(k−1)tX + ujt (1)
where PTVjt is the propensity to vote for party j in year t (t ∈ {1999, 2004, 2009}),
d(lrj) is the absolute distance between the positions of individuals lrit and
the position of party j as seen on average by survey respondents on the
left/right scale. Analogously, d(euj) is the absolute value of the distance
between the positions of individuals lrit and the position of party j as seen
on average by survey respondents on the European integration scale. That is
d(lrj) = (lrit−lrjt), where lrjt = 1n
∑n
i=1 lrj,it and lrj,it , the position accorded
to party j by individual i and d(euj) = |euit−eujt |, where eujt = 1n
∑n
i=1 euj,it
and euj,it , the position accorded to party j by individual i. The matrix X
contains k − 3 control variables.
The control variables include gender and self–placement into a social class.
It would be desirable to include further control variables such as retrospective
and prospective economic evaluation or political sophistication. However,
the variables included as controls are subject to their availability in the data
set. To maintain the comparability of the results across different surveys, the
regressions run should look the same, in the sense that the variables included
are the same. Economic evaluation questions have unfortunately only been
included since the 2004 survey and knowledge questions that would allow one
to construct a political sophistication index only since 2009 (for a discussion
of the importance of voter sophistication for mass elections see: Palfrey and
Poole [1987]). This is a pity, as regressions run in the years where these
variables were available showed that they do have a significant effect.
Further, it should be noted, particularly later for the interpretation of the
results, that the scaling of the both the left/right and European integration
scales were changed for the 2009 survey. In the prior years these ran between
11The index i refers to individual respondents and j to political parties.
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1 and 10, whereas in the 2009 survey between 0 and 10.
The results for hypothesis 1 and 2, as well as a part of those for hypothesis
4, are produced with the following regression equation:
PTVjt = βj,0t +βj,1td(lrj) +βj,2td(euj) +βj,3tantij +βj,4t−j,(k−1)tX +ujt (2)
In equation 2 the variable antij is a dummy variable that indicates if
an individual was categorised as for or against European integration. The
details to the construction of this variable can be found in the discussion of
the statistical models for hypothesis 4 below. In what follows, the method
that will be used to test the four hypotheses will be outlined in greater detail.
Hypothesis 1
European integration impacts on the attractiveness of political
parties for citizens.
The first hypothesis postulates that cases (at least one) can be found
where the issue of European integration significantly affects the average pop-
ularity of a political party. That is to say, that there exists at least one case
where βj,2t has a statistically significant effect on the dependent variable.
Although the rejection of null hypothesis requires only one such case, it is
expected that the cases will be more numerous. This hypothesis, however,
says nothing about the sign of βj,2t . In general, though, the signs for both
βj,1t and βj,2t are expected to be negative as a party is assumed to drop in the
favour of an individual the further it is from her position. This hypothesis
is tested by running the regression displayed in equation 2 individually for
each political party in a country in a particular survey year.
Hypothesis 2
The importance of the European integration issue for the at-
tractiveness of parties for citizens has increased over time.
For this hypothesis to stand the test, there are three options. The first
is that, there exist two time points t and t + 1, where βj,2t+1 < βj,2t . The
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direction of the inequality sign follows from the expectation that βj,2t and βj,1t
will be negative. The second case would be where βj,2t becomes statistically
significant where it was not at the time point prior to this. The last option
would be that βj,2t gains in magnitude in absolute terms in relation to the
coefficient for the left/right distance variable βj,1t . This hypothesis is, by
necessity, limited to cases where a party existed at both points in time that
are being compared. The same regression results as for the first hypothesis
are used for this one. The resulting β coefficients from equation 1 are simply
compared over time.
Hypothesis 3
Extreme parties profit more from the European integration is-
sue than moderate parties.
This hypothesis first requires a concrete definition for extreme left, ex-
treme right and moderate parties. In line with de Vries [2007], we define left
extremist parties as those parties whose position on the left/right dimension
lies at least one standard deviation below the average position of all parties
in a country, extreme right parties whose position lies at least one standard
deviation above the national average and moderate parties as all others that
do not fall into either of these categories:
• extreme left parties as parties for which lrjt < lrct − sd(lrct),
• extreme right parties as parties for which lrjt > lrct + sd(lrct) and
• moderate parties where lrct − sd(lrct) ≤ lrjt ≤ lrct + sd(lrct).
where lrct is the average party position in country c at time t and sd(lrct)
the standard deviation from this mean for country c at time t.
There are two possible ways one could approach this question. First, one
could use the regression results obtained from the use of equation 1. One
could then compare the outcomes for political parties that were categorised
as extreme and those that were not. We would then expect that on average
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βe,2t < βm,2t , where e is the subscript for an extreme party and m the sub-
script for a moderate one. Again, the direction of the inequality sign is due
to the coefficients being expected to be negative.
A second way to approach this would be to run an alternative regression,
where instead of treating each political party as a separate case, all political
parties are included in a case for a particular survey year together with
an interaction variable between a left/right extreme party dummy variable
and the European integration distance variable. This model would have the
following structure:
PTVcjt = βc,0t+βc,1td(lrj)+βc,2td(euj)+βcetint extj+βj,3t−j,(k−1)tX+uct (3)
The variable int extj is the interactive variable obtained by multiplying
d(euj) with the dummy ext lrj ∈ {0, 1}. ext lrj takes on the value of one for
extreme parties on the left/right scale and zero otherwise. The interactive
variable int extj then takes on the value of zero in total for moderate political
parties.
What kind of information does the coefficient βcet provide us with? To see
this more clearly we rewrite int extj as d(euj) ∗ ext lrj and find the partial
derivative for equation 3 with respect to d(euj) (see Griffiths et al. [1993] and
Wooldridge [2006]):
∂(PTVcjt)
∂(d(euj))
= βc,2t + βc,etext lrj (4)
From this we can see that βcet will disappear for moderate parties and
remains for parties that are extreme. Thus, βcet should tell us any “extra”
effect that the distance variable d(euj) has on the dependent variable for
individuals on average. In other words, we seek to find out if an individual
on average places different value on the European integration dimension when
confronted with an extreme party as opposed to a moderate one.
A regression of this form divides the sample into two subsamples, where
the slope of the regression will be different for the two subsets. The for-
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mulation of the hypothesis would lead us to expect that βcet will also be
negative. The closer that an extreme political party is in its position to that
of an individual, the more we would expect it to rise in the favour of that
individual. Should it be that the attractiveness of extreme political parties
is more affected by the European integration dimension than moderate par-
ties, as is proposed by the hypothesis, then this coefficient should show itself
to be statistically significant. If the coefficient is not statistically significant
and negative, the evaluation of a political party in relation to the European
integration dimension does not decrease with increased distance between the
position of the party and individual.
Hypothesis 4
Anti-integration positions have a greater impact on individual
preferences over parties than pro-integration positions.
The manner in which this hypothesis was formulated, again two possible
ways to approach it exist. We use two different regression analyses to look
at this research question. Firstly, the regressions run with the application of
equation 2 contains the variable antij which categorises individuals according
to their self-placement on the European integration scale. This variable is a
dummy variable of the following structure:
• antij = 1 if eui < 4.5 for the years 1999 and 2004
• antij = 1 if eui < 5 for the year 2009
• antij = 0 otherwise
The variable has to be constructed differently for the year 2009 due to
the change in the scaling of the variable in the questionnaire. This variable
is included in equation 2. There is no particular expectation attached to
the coefficient βj,3t for this variable with regards to its sign. Recall that the
regressions run with this equation are run separately for individual political
parties. As βj,3t is the coefficient for a dummy variable, we are splitting the
sample into two subsamples contained in the same regression, one with those
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that appreciate European integration and one with those that do not. In
other words, we have two different intercepts for the two subsamples. First,
βj,0t on its own for those that were categorised as being at least not anti-
integrationist and βj,0t + βj,3t for those that were. It would make sense to
assume that in the regression results for political parties that are themselves
anti-integrationist that the total intercept will be larger for the subset of
anti-integrationist individuals. Put differently, for such parties βj,3t should
be positive and for political parties that are more pro-integratinist negative.
This is what we expect to find.
However, the procedure described above will only help us to answer the
question of whether being pro– or anti–integrationist has any effect on the as-
sessment individuals make of different political parties. What we will not be
able to establish with this form of analysis is whether the European integra-
tion dimension, or the distance of political parties positions from individual
positions will have any effect on the average evaluation of political parties by
individuals. In other words, whether greater weight is given to the European
integration dimension by those that are not too much in favour of European
integration. In order to test this part of the hypothesis, we run a regression
that is of a similar structure to the one run for hypothesis 3 described in
equation 3:
PTVcjt = βc,0t + βc,1td(lrj) + βc,2td(euj) + βc,atint antij + βj,3t−j,(k−1)tX + uct
(5)
The sole difference between this equation and equation 3, is the inter-
action variable int antij attached to the coefficient βc,at , where int antij =
d(euj)∗antij. Again, to facilitate the understanding of the results, we display
the partial derivative of equation 5 with respect to d(euj):
∂(PTVcjt)
∂(d(euj))
= βc,2t + βc,atint antij (6)
There are some important points that need to be made about the differ-
ences of this equation to those of equations 2 and 3. Firstly, the regressions
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run according to equation 2 are run for political parties individually, whereas
as those from equation 5, like those from equation 3, are run for entire coun-
tries in time period. Secondly, the interaction variable int antij in equation
5 varies across all individuals in the sample because each individual receives
a value for antij, whereas the interaction variable int extj in equation 3
containing the variable ext lrj, which varies across political parties and not
individuals, makes reference to political parties.
5.4 Testing for the necessary conditions
In section 4.3 we identified a number of necessary conditions under which
it is possible that European integration affects the preference structure of
individuals across political parties. On the demand side of the citizens it
was said that citizens must 1) have manifest preferences about European
integration and that 2) these preferences must vary across individuals. On
the supply side of the political parties we similarly required that 1) political
parties must have positions on the issue of European integration and 2) that
there must be variance across parties in terms of these positions so that
citizens are presented with a choice. A more general requirement was the
existence of a two dimensional European political space. This section uses
the EES data12 to ascertain whether the necessary conditions for the research
questions are in fact present.
5.4.1 Demand side
On the ’demand side’ we first required voters to have ’real’ attitudes or pref-
erences not only on the left/right dimension, but also on the EU integration
dimension (de Vries [2007];van der Eijk and Franklin [2001]). We measure
this by looking first, at the percent of responses to this question in the three
EES surveys in comparison to the responses on the left/right dimension. If
the majority of individuals is capable of placing themselves on the EU inte-
12It must be noted that the sample that we are using for these and the analyses in section
6 is reduced to those individuals that responded to the questions for self-placement on both
the EU integration and left/right dimensions.
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gration scale and if this number is not significantly less than those who are
able to do so on the left/right scale, we will conclude that the preferences on
European integration are ’real’ or manifest. Non-response to self-placement
is displayed in table 2. On average the non–response rates are rather low for
both dimensions with some exceptions. Spain in the year 2004 and Finland,
France and Luxembourg in 1999 stand out. But, even these comparatively
large non–response rates, lie far below one half. Importantly, the rates for
the European integration dimension are very similar in magnitude to those
on the left/right scale, sometimes even smaller. From this we can permit
ourselves to conclude that individuals have real or manifest preferences with
regards to European integration.
Table 2: Non-response to self-placement on EU integration and left/right
dimensions in %
1999 2004 2009
Country EU l/r EU l/r EU l/r
Austria 2.99 12.38 1.39 4.75 2.00 6.3
Germany 1.3 5.2 5.54 10.23 1.0 3.98
Denmark 5.39 6.79 5.69 6.53 0.7 1.7
Spain 7.9 16.8 31.87 20.12 4.4 4.0
Finland 15.77 14.77 4.11 5.22 1.2 3.6
France 12.06 20.1 0.43 1.92 3.9 8.5
Great Britain 6.55 10.85 4.67 12.80 2.5 9.2
Greece 7.80 9.2 2.2 4.8 2.9 9.2
Ireland 2.98 10.54 2.34 7.54 1.5 8.39
Luxembourg 11.3 16.28 1.72 5.39 2.4 6.09
Netherlands 3.5 8.39 7.76 8.95 1.39 3.48
Portugal 14.0 22.40 13.90 11.1 17.1 8.8
Source: own calculation from EES 1999, 2004 and 2009.
Secondly, we required that these preferences exhibit a certain amount of
variance in order for them to have a potential impact on the way in which
individuals judge parties. For this, we look at the standard deviations in
responses to the self-positioning of individuals on the EU integration and
left/right scales. The results are displayed in table 3, which tables the median
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of the EU integration and left/right self-placements together with standard
deviations (the measure we are mainly interested in) in brackets below for all
countries in the sample for the years 1999, 2004 and 2009 of the three EES
surveys.
Two things stand out in table 3. Firstly, for most countries in the table
the median for EU integration has dropped over the time period looked at.
We recall that the EU integration dimensions runs between 1 and 10, with 1
meaning that ’EU integration has gone too far’ and 10 that EU integration
should be pushed further. That is, in the 2009 survey it runs between 0 and
10. The middle value for the first two surveys is therefore 4.5 and 5 for the
2009 survey. Taking this into account, we see that the median has dropped
more on average than appears at first glance from the 2004 to the 2009
survey. The average values for the EU integration dimension dropping over
time then means that on average individuals in numerous countries wished
to see EU integration being pushed further in 1999 than they did in the
2009 survey. This is most marked in Great Britain, Greece, Luxembourg
and Portugal, but also quite visible in Austria, Germany and Ireland. This
downward trend is not so visible in the Netherlands or Denmark, where they
appear to go into the opposite direction. Comparatively, albeit not entirely,
the mean self-placements on the left/right dimension have been more stable
during the time between 1999 and 2009.
Regarding the variance (standard deviation) of the two dimensions across
individuals in a country in a year, it is interesting that in all but two cases
(Denmark in 2009, the Netherlands in 1999), the variance was larger on
the EU integration dimension than variance on the left/right dimension. In
many cases it was a lot larger. To make this easier to see, table 4 portrays the
results from a ratio calculated for this. This ratio is constructed by dividing
the the standard deviations on the European integration scale by that of the
left/right scale. A value above one indicates that there is more variance on
the European integration than on the left/right dimension. This indicates
that there are indeed varying views taken by individuals on this dimension,
which political parties could potentially use to gain favour among certain
individuals provided that the issue is important enough to individuals.
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Table 3: Mean and standard deviations for EU integration and left/right self
placement
1999 2004 2009
Country EU l/r EU l/r EU l/r
Austria 5.22 5.14 4.6 4.85 4.32 4.92
(2.69) (1.89) (2.74) (1.92) (3.14) (2.18)
Germany 6.42 5.06 5.45 5.07 5.24 5.22
(2.54) (2.07) (2.76) (2.0) (2.98) (2.26)
Denmark 5.18 5.69 5.31 5.88 5.36 5.16
(2.74) (2.22) (2.53) (2.3) (2.62) (2.74)
Spain 6.57 4.94 6.31 4.17 6.43 4.78
(2.84) (2.65) (2.24) (2.09) (2.83) (2.75)
Finland 4.47 5.98 4.45 5.98 4.37 6.0
(2.61) (2.33) (2.38) (2.24) (2.55) (2.28)
France 6.41 4.72 5.62 4.75 4.77 4.88
(2.64) (2.22) (2.74) (2.69) (3.35) (2.58)
Great Britain 4.74 5.1 4.14 5.31 3.74 5.39
(2.69) (2.1) (2.82) (2.19) (2.84) (2.4)
Greece 7.12 5.79 6.6 6.04 5.39 4.95
(3.05) (2.1) (3.2) (2.82) (3.45) (2.76)
Ireland 5.41 5.67 5.26 5.7 5.31 5.43
(2.57) (2.07) (2.5) (2.3) (2.67) (2.46)
Luxembourg 6.57 5.49 5.14 5.5 4.88 5.36
(2.54) (2.0) (2.48) (1.8) (2.99) (2.16)
Netherlands 6.47 5.34 5.18 5.05 5.55 5.05
(2.22) (2.22) (2.46) (2.37) (2.62) (2.47)
Portugal 6.54 5.37 6.08 5.66 5.08 5.13
(3.49) (1.86) (2.93) (2.81) (3.12) (2.5)
Source: own calculation from EES 1999, 2004 and 2009. Table contains mean with the
standard deviations in brackets below.
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Table 4: Ratio of citizen dispersion on the EU integration and left/right
dimensions
Country 1999 2004 2009
Austria 1.42 1.43 1.44
Germany 1.22 1.38 1.32
Denmark 1.23 1.1 0.95
Spain 1.07 1.07 1.03
Finland 1.12 1.06 1.12
France 1.2 1.02 1.3
Great Britain 1.28 1.29 1.18
Greece 1.45 1.13 1.25
Ireland 1.24 1.07 1.09
Luxembourg 1.27 1.38 1.38
Netherlands 1.0 1.04 1.06
Portugal 1.88 1.04 1.25
Source: own calculation from EES 1999, 2004 and 2009.
Further, we required that these preferences on EU integration are salient.
This we do not test directly with the data. Instead, we rely on the conclusions
of Franklin and Wlezien [1997], that the salience of the European project
has significantly increased over time. The salience of European integration is
not directly incorporated into the statistical model. To test the hypotheses
outlined in section 5.3.2, we calculate separate regressions by party, year and
country (see section 5.3.3 for a discussion on this). The only way we are then
able to ascertain the salience of the European integration issue is if we find
that this dimension has an effect on our dependent variable. Any conclusions
about salience are then merely inferred from the results in section 6.
5.4.2 Supply side
The sleeping giant hypothesis states that the ’giant can awaken’ if voters
have an outlet for their preferences regarding European integration at the
polls. In other words, that which is on offer by political parties on what was
termed the supply side must present different options for the electorate to
decide between. To test whether this is indeed the case or not, we take a
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look at the variance (we use the standard deviation as a measure for this) in
party positions on European integration and we also compare this, as for the
demand side, with variance on the left/right dimension. Again we use the
three EES surveys for this. It could be argued that it would be preferable
to use expert surveys for party positions as these would yield estimates that
are more ’objective’ or ’correct’. I choose not to do this because I deem it
more appropriate to use the positions of political parties as it is perceived
by individuals on average rather than expert opinions as there is reason
to assume that they may sometimes deviate somewhat from one another.
The reason why I hold this position is that it is often enough observable
that views are held by the general public that no ’expert’ in the relevant
field would support. An excellent example of this is the idea that is held
by many in numerous member states of the Eurozone, that the Euro has
made life more expensive. No economist in her right mind would make such
a claim. The average placement of political parties will be the measure
used for party positions. Another argument for this choice is that voters
are placing themselves on the same metric as they are placing the political
parties. This means that the interpretation they give to a scale will be the
same for themselves and political parties [Blais and Bodet, 2006, Golder and
Stramski, 2010]. Further, the theoretical model assumes that individuals are
boundedly rational. Therefore, “we must characterize the political situation,
not as it appears “objectively” to the analyst, but as it appears subjectively
to the actors. [Simon, 1985, pg. 298]” Some authors use the party placements
of the most educated in the sample, whereas others use the mean across the
whole sample. But Powell [2009] finds that there is no real difference in the
results and thus we also use the average of the entire sample for a particular
party in a particular year.
Table 5 displays the mean, range (max-min) and standard deviations
for the average placements of political parties by country and year. The
range was not calculated for the individual self-placements in table 3 as the
responses are discrete and filled the entire available range as it suffices for two
persons to locate themselves at one of the extremities for this to be the case.
As average placements are being looked at in table 5 and there are few parties
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as compared to individuals in the sample, the range will have a meaning.
Although the range and the standard deviation will be very strongly related,
the standard deviation is nevertheless given as the information contained in
this measure is not entirely the same as the range. The standard deviation
gives a measure for the variance about the mean, whereas the range indicates
the distance between extremities.
There are a number of surprising results contained in table 5. The first
thing, which does not appear as a surprise as it was expected, is that the range
and standard deviations for the EU integration dimension are systematically,
with only three exceptions (Germany and Denmark 1999 and Ireland 2009),
smaller than for the left/right dimension. However, a little more surprisingly,
there is not much of a systematic pattern to be discerned for the range and
standard deviations over time. The magnitude of the differences differs across
countries, where for countries such as Finland and France they are rather
large and for others, such as particularly Great Britain, they are so small
that they can be seen as negligible.
I had expected that, in general, there would be an increase in range and
variance over time, but the results do not allow for such a conclusion at all.
In fact there is no systematic pattern discernible over time13. In Finland and
France the range and standard deviations increased quite a bit over time; in
Austria and Luxembourg a little less. In Germany, Denmark and Portugal
the perceived range and standard deviations actually decreased in the time
period being looked at. In the rest of the countries in the sample, Spain,
Great Britain, Greece, Ireland and the Netherlands, the changes in these two
measures did not take on one particular direction across the three points in
time. These results appear to throw open more questions than they answer.
13It is important to note at this point that it does not make too much sense to view
these figures over time as a ’trend’. Although they may be indicative of one, and we do
in a superficial manner treat them a little as such, the measures are only given for three
years for each country with a time lapse of four years in between. Certain issues make
it to the fore at different points in time and they will be reflected in the data used here.
Should a domestic issue be much debated in the media at the point in time of a survey,
the partisan conflict over this issue will probably viewed as great and thus the conflict on
the left right dimension. Should such an issue be one concerning European integration,
the converse will most probably hold.
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Table 5: Mean, range and standard deviations for EU integration and
left/right party positions
1999 2004 2009
Country EU l/r EU l/r EU l/r
Austria mean 4.71 4.69 4.41 4.15 4.24 4.67
range 2.61 3.67 3.02 5.58 4.26 5.97
sd 0.87 1.23 1.22 2.02 1.63 1.92
Germany mean 4.59 4.55 4.56 4.84 5.22 4.5
range 4.32 4.19 3.71 4.73 2.56 5.64
sd 1.55 1.54 1.22 1.7 0.95 1.92
Denmark mean 4.2 4.7 4.28 4.64 5.04 5.41
range 5.48 4.96 4.39 4.81 3.6 5.16
sd 1.95 1.7 1.87 1.95 1.18 1.81
Spain mean 4.68 4.19 5.34 4.04 4.09 4.11
range 3.21 5.6 1.07 6.02 3.45 5.98
sd 1.13 1.83 0.36 1.94 1.13 1.6
Finland mean 4.84 4.0 4.84 5.02 5.23 5.47
range 0.7 5.0 3.42 5.71 4.66 6.44
sd 0.25 1.42 1.09 1.6 1.36 1.78
France mean 4.98 5.0 3.73 4.37 4.38 4.24
range 2.22 7.19 3.2 5.62 4.08 7.19
sd 0.67 2.47 1.13 1.98 1.22 2.43
Great Britain mean 3.93 4.12 4.04 4.55 3.91 4.7
range 2.74 2.87 2.07 2.09 3.0 3.17
sd 0.83 0.92 0.67 0.81 1.02 1.0
Greece mean 5.09 4.61 4.51 4.59 4.8 5.07
range 3.6 6.16 4.54 5.43 4.3 5.77
sd 1.15 1.93 1.75 2.14 1.49 2.18
Ireland mean 4.79 4.34 4.7 4.56 4.42 4.61
range 2.71 3.37 2.0 3.0 3.35 3.15
sd 0.8 1.18 0.66 1.3 1.24 1.05
Luxembourg mean 5.02 4.02 4.57 4.18 4.42 4.42
range 2.4 4.98 2.68 4.86 4.39 5.55
sd 0.96 1.54 1.04 1.7 1.71 1.8
Netherlands mean 4.62 4.95 4.82 5.0 5.0 5.35
range 3.73 3.95 2.4 4.97 3.7 4.7
sd 1.09 1.3 0.83 1.87 1.2 1.56
Portugal mean 5.14 4.15 4.25 4.38 4.84 4.6
range 3.72 6.81 2.87 4.37 2.55 5.93
sd 1.52 2.66 1.14 1.75 0.98 2.54
Source: own calculation from EES 1999, 2004 and 2009.
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Nevertheless, we can see that there are not so many cases in the sample
where the standard deviations and range of the EU integration dimension
are extremely small as compared to that of the left/right dimension. The
smallest standard deviation can be found in Spain in 2004 with 0.36 and
Finland in 1999 (Finland joined the European Union four years before this
date) with 0.25. But in general the values are larger and we conclude that
in most years in most countries there were options on offer, that although
they varied less than on the left/right dimension, did present individuals
with different choices with regards to the EU integration dimension. The
theoretical discussion would suggest that the effects in the cases for which
the choice on offer was very limited, we will not be able to find much effect
of the EU integration dimension on the dependent variable. We will pay
particular attention to such cases from table 5 in our analyses in section 6.
To get a better overview of partisan conflict on the two dimensions, we
further tabulate a ratio measure proposed by de Vries [2007] which is mea-
sured by
sd(euct )
sd(lrct )
, where sd(euct) is defined as the standard deviation from
country mean of party positions on the EU integration dimension (sd(lrct)
was defined analogously earlier in the text).
Table 6 does not contain new information, but summarises the standard
deviations of party positions for the EU integration and left/right dimensions
from table 5. We read the ratios in this table as the relative partisan conflict
of the two dimensions. A ratio smaller than 1 indicates that respondents view
partisan conflict to be greater on the left/right dimension and conversely a
ratio greater than 1 indicates a perception of greater partisan conflict on the
EU integration dimension on the part of respondents.
Particularly Germany and Denmark appear to have had a significant de-
crease in party conflict over time, where domestic issues have had an upswing
in importance.
These results are similar to those of Catherine de Vries de Vries [2007] for
the four countries she looked at (Denmark, Germany, Netherlands and the
United Kingdom), although not the same. She uses national election surveys
and not the EES (this also means that the years she used are different across
the countries she looks at) for her study and we would expect the results to
68
Table 6: Ratio of party dispersion on the EU integration and left/right di-
mensions
Country 1999 2004 2009
Austria 0.67 0.6 0.85
Germany 1.0 0.7 0.49
Denmark 1.15 0.96 0.65
Spain 0.62 0.19 0.71
Finland 0.18 0.68 0.76
France 0.27 0.57 0.5
Great Britain 0.9 0.83 1.02
Greece 0.6 0.82 0.68
Ireland 0.68 0.51 1.18
Luxembourg 0.62 0.61 0.95
Netherlands 0.84 0.44 0.77
Portugal 0.57 0.64 0.38
Source: own calculation from EES 1999, 2004 and 2009.
be a little different, which they are indeed. It is encouraging nevertheless,
that the patterns visible in her results and those displayed here are similar
in the sense that they exhibit similar patterns in relation to one another.
5.4.3 Political space
The idea of modeling political contestation as taking place within a political
space was discussed in section 4. This part of the thesis serves to establish,
based on the data used (described in section 5.1), whether the European
political space is best viewed as a one or two dimensional space, or more
precisely whether the left/right and European integration dimensions span
a one or two dimensional space. As was argued before, this is of particular
interest to us for the research questions of this thesis, because the research
questions in conjunction with the methods and data proposed for answering
them make only sense if the European political space can be viewed as two
dimensional.
Should the left/right dimension capture the EU integration dimension
entirely, there is no reason to assume that a spatial model could in any way
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distinguish the effects of European integration from the effects of domestic
issues as it were. Thus, the political science literature applying spatial models
abounds with the use of terms such as space, dimensions, orthogonality, linear
independence and correlation when describing the nature of a political space.
In essence, these terms are borrowed from linear algebra, and despite them
often being used synonymously in the literature, are by no means equivalent
in the mathematical sense, albeit strongly related. Because of the importance
of these mathematical ideas, one of the following sections is dedicated in
large part to a discussion of this part of linear algebra14 and uses this area
of mathematics to derive a model of the dimensions of political spaces.
The Approaches. Benoit and Laver [2011] forward ex-ante and ex-post
approaches as a criterion for distinguishing the approaches used in studies
looking at the dimensionality of political spaces. The approach taken to de-
termining the political space within which the research question is posed is
an ex-post approach in the sense that it asks what story the data tells. To be
sure, a number of ex-ante assumptions are made when framing the analysis.
Firstly, based on the discussion in 3.3, it is assumed that political preferences
are structured in such a way that they can be subsumed in constructs such
as the left/right dimension. Secondly, it is assumed that preferences about
the European Union need not necessarily be captured equallally well by the
left/right dimension as domestic issue preferences are. Further, I am making
the obvious assumption that I shall explicitly state nonetheless, that the data
can tell the story relevant for my research questions. In other words, it is
assumed that when people respond to the relevant questions in a question-
naire, these individuals associate very similar ideas and structures within one
political system for the particular concepts. That is to say, one persons’s left
and right is assumed to be very similar to the left and right of her neighbour.
14It should be noted here that because dimensions such as left and right are bounded
(i.e. run for example between 0 and 10), the claim to be dealing with linear algebra is
actually not correct. Bounded vector spaces leave the realm of linear algebra and need to
be treated as topological spaces. However, as in this chapter we are only interesting in
the dimsions of this space regardless of its bounds, it is still meaningful to apply linear
algebra and this also makes the task at hand significantly easier.
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Lastly, the model and methods developed in this section to determine the
dimensionality of the European political space are based on the assumption
that the relationship between the domestic left/right and EU dimensions is
linear. This is certainly not a trivial assumption in light of the famous in-
verted U-curve that manifests itself in expert survey data on the positions of
parties on the two dimensions. This will be further discussed later.
The European Political Space as a Special Case. Marks and Steen-
bergen [2002] identify four possibilities for the relationship between the left/right
and European integration dimensions, three of which are relevant here. The
three types of relationship potentially existing between these two dimensions
that can be distinguished within a comparative politics framework (the fourth
possibility they forward is connected to an international relations framework)
can be termed as:
1. orthogonal
2. oblique
3. fused in a single dimension
Both options 2. and 3. posit a linear relationship between the two di-
mensions. The relationship inherent to option 3 is a strong one, as here
the positions of political actors on both dimensions can be subsumed into
one. This would mean that the position on one of the two dimensions would
be a perfect predictor for the other. This kind of relationship between pol-
icy positions in the European political space is associated with Tsebelis and
Garrett [2000]. Should we find evidence for option 3., we would be forced
to conclude that, according to the data used, the European political space is
uni-dimensional and we would be done.
Option 1. - orthogonality between the dimensions - implies that there is
no relationship at all between the two dimensions. In other words, knowing
the position of a political actor on the left/right dimension gives us no in-
formation about their position on the European integration dimension and
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vice versa. This model of the dimensions of the European political space is
associated with Hix and Lord.
The second option - an oblique relationship - posits a relationship between
the two dimensions that differs from that of option 3 in that an actor’s
position on the one dimension does provide information on her position on
the other, but is not a perfect predictor in that the positions cannot be
subsumed on one dimension. This model is associated with Hooghe and
Marks.
An orthogonal or oblique relationship between the two dimensions im-
plies a two dimensional political space, whereas the ability to fuse the two
into a single dimension obviously implies a one dimensional space. If option
three had to hold for the data the question asked in this thesis of the kind
of influence that preferences about European integration on the part of the
electorate has in national elections would be obsolete. If one’s preferences
about domestic politics and European integration have a one to one rela-
tionship as is suggested by this model, there is no possibility for someone to
find any kind of motivation in their vote choice in a party’s position on the
European dimension.
This is no longer the case if the relationship between the two variable is
not of this kind. In the case of a two dimensional European political space,
the possibility that someone finds some part of their motivation for their vote
choice in a party’s position on the European integration dimensions does
exist. Of course this does not immediately follow simply from the political
space being two dimensional and it is precisely this which this thesis aims to
investigate, provided that sufficient evidence is found to model the political
space as two dimensional.
As was already suggested earlier, it is not enough to simply determine
which dimensions the political space has, but also what kind of relationship
exists between the dimensions. Possibility 3. has already been sufficiently
discussed, but for the two dimensional case the possible relationships are
described by options 1. and 2. If the relationship between the two variables
is orthogonal, the research question can be tested with some form of ordinary
regression analysis.
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In the following we will construct a mathematical model of political space
and then apply this model to the data to determine which of the three po-
tential cases outlined above we are faced with.
Figure 4: Graphical illustration of the three possible scenarios of the rela-
tionship between the two dimensions
orthogonal oblique fused
Source: own construction
A Mathematical Model of Political Space. If we take the policy posi-
tions of n persons within a political system on some scale, the data we collect
can be viewed as a vector in Rn. This vector on its own spans a line in Rn.
In other words, it spans a one dimensional space; that is, simply a line that
is equivalent to R. If we add another such vector in Rn, the two vectors
may be linearly independent in which case they span the plane R2or linearly
dependent in which case they span R. We now define Di as the vector of
citizen positions on the domestic left/right scale and Ei as their preference
vector on the European integration dimension for country i, with
Ec = (e1c, e2c, . . . , enc)
′
Dc = (d1c, d2c, . . . , dnc)
′,
where eic and dic are the positions of individual i in country c in the
European integration and domestic left/right dimensions respectively. Fig-
ure 4 shows what such vectors could look like for the different scenarios of
orthogonal, oblique or fused dimensions outlined earlier in section.
In the discussions of the papers reviewed about dimensionality, the terms
73
orthogonality, linear independence and correlation occur very often. The in-
troduction promised a discussion of these terms and this will be presented
here. Two vectors span a two dimensional space or R2 if they are linearly in-
dependent. This would occur for the cases in the diagram termed orthogonal
and oblique. The two vectors are not linearly independent, that is linearly
dependent, in the third case where together they span only one dimension.
We concentrate on the two cases of linear independent vectors and call to
mind the discussion from before, where we saw that in the case of orthogonal
vectors the position on one vector provides no information about a position
on the other and that in the case of oblique vectors some information about
one of the two dimensions is contained in the other, but not all. My initial
reaction was to calculate the correlation between the two vectors to distin-
guish between the two cases (and also the third) as other authors have done.
However, it turns out that this is not an optimal strategy.
Rodgers et al. [1984] show that the relationship between linearly indepen-
dent, orthogonal and uncorrelated vectors can be displayed as in figure 5. So
for the cases of linear independence, it is possible for a correlation coefficient
to equal zero, also when the vectors are not orthogonal and this we do not
want, as we wish to have a measure that can distinguish between the two
cases. (See also Gibbons [1968] for a brief discussion on zero correlation and
independence of variable.)
Based on this discussion, I present another measure to look at the relation-
ship between two vectors. This measure, which I shall term the CS-measure
in this text, is most commonly known as the cosine of similarity or uncentred
correlation coefficient. It uses the fact that the angle between two vectors
can be described as their cosine. We define the CS-measure for a country c
as follows:
CSc = cos(α) =
(Dc)
′(Ec)
||Dc|| ||Ec|| (7)
where ||.|| is the Euclidean norm of a vector and α the angle between two
vectors. The reader will recognise the similarity to the correlation coefficient.
The CS-measure has a very similar structure, however, unlike the correlation
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Figure 5: The relationship between linearly independent,orthogonal, and
uncorrelated variables
uncorrelated
linearly indepen-
dent
orthogonal
Source: reconstructed from Rodgers et al. [1984]
coefficient it makes use of the raw vectors instead of the centred vectors.
Using figure 4, it is easy to see that if two vectors are orthogonal they have
an angle of 90◦ between them and we know that cos(90◦) = 0. So, if two
vectors span a two dimensional space and are furthermore orthogonal, the
CS-measure is zero. On the other extreme, when the two vectors lie on the
same line in that they span a one dimensional space, the angle between them
is 0◦ and the CS-measure is then equal to one or minus 1. In the remaining
cases, it will hold that two vectors are linearly independent and as such span
a two dimensional space, where CS ∈ (−1, 0)∪ (0, 1). This is summarised in
table 7.
Thus, the CS-measure provides a “nice” normalised measure of the rela-
tionship between two vectors in the sense that the interpretation is familiar
from the correlation coefficient. However, the two measures measure differ-
ent things: whereas the CS-measure looks at the relationship between two
vectors in a space, the correlation coefficient, being the normalised covari-
ance of two data vectors, measures whether the data ’moves’ together or not
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(and how much) in their deviations from the mean. Presenting the difference
between the two measures as such, it becomes more intuitive why we can
come across some of the situations that are described in figure 5.
Table 7: Interpretation of the Cosine of Similarity
CS Interpretation
∈ {−1, 1} two dimensions span one dimensional space
= 0 two dimensions span two dimensional space and are orthogonal
∈ (−1, 0) ∪ (0, 1) two dimensions span two dimensional space and are oblique
Data from the EES 1999, 2004 and 2003 for twelve member states (see 5.2
for details to the case selection) for individual positioning on the left/right
and EU dimensions is used to calculate the cosine of similarity for the data
sets that will be used in the empirical analysis in section 6. These results are
presented in table 8.
Table 8: Cosine of Similarity: left/right and EU integration dimensions
Cosine of Similarity
Country 1999 2004 2009
Austria 0.78 0.76 0.69
Germany 0.84 0.77 0.77
Denmark 0.82 0.82 0.77
Spain 0.73 0.64 0.75
Finland 0.72 0.82 0.80
France 0.72 0.77 0.68
Great Britain 0.74 0.69 0.66
Greece 0.75 0.79 0.70
Ireland 0.79 0.82 0.80
Luxembourg 0.82 0.82 0.78
Netherlands 0.82 0.78 0.78
Portugal 0.73 0.74 0.70
Source: own calculation from EES 1999, 2004 and 2009
Taking a look at the table 8, one can observe that the CS-measure for
all countries in all three time periods under inspection is relatively large,
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ranging from 0.66 to 0.84. These measures correspond to angles between
48.7◦ and 32.9◦15 between the two vectors. Evidently, we find ourselves in
the situation of case 2., where the relationship between the two dimensions
is, as it has been termed in the literature, oblique16. The CS-measures we
can observe, tell us that the two dimensions, left/right and EU integration,
from two vectors that are linearly independent of one another and span a
two dimensional space, but that they are not orthogonal.
The correlation coefficients were also calculated for the same cases as
the CS-measure and are presented in table 9. The correlation coefficient
is often used in the literature to answer the question of the relationship
between two political dimensions for which we used the CS-measure instead.
A correlation coefficient near 0 is often taken as indicating orthogonality
between two political dimensions. The correlation coefficients in table 9
are strikingly small, albeit sometimes statistically significantly different from
zero sometimes not. However, from table 8 of the CS-measures we know that
the two vectors of the two different political dimensions cannot be viewed as
orthogonal. What information then, does the correlation coefficient give us?
Firstly, we conclude that the correlation coefficients do not provide us
with a measure for orthogonality or linear dependence, although this coef-
ficient is often used to do exactly this. Secondly, because the correlation
coefficient measures whether two sets of data move together in the same di-
rection or in opposed directions in deviation from their mean, we can read
two things off the results in table 9. On the one hand, as we already noted,
the correlation coefficients in this table are rather small, which lets us know
that the two dimensions we are looking at do not covary much. In other
words, the knowledge of an individual’s position on one dimension has little
predictive power over the position of this individual on the second dimension.
On the other hand, we can observe that there are both positive and nega-
15The CS-measures in the table do not give any information as to whether the angle is
positive or negative, but simply which of the three cases we find ourselves in.
16The choice of the term ”oblique”’ for this relationship is rather unfortunate, as oblique
angles are those that lie between (not including) 90◦ and 180◦ and the angles we are looking
at here are in most cases acute. Nevertheless, the term ”‘oblique”’ shall be used in this
thesis to describe the relationship between two political dimensions in the case when they
are neither orthogonal nor span the same line.
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tive correlation coefficients to be found, both of which are common and thus
neither can be viewed as an anomaly. It is also interesting to see that the
sign changes in some cases in the same country in different years. We will,
however, not try to explain characteristics of the correlation coefficients in
this text and simply content ourselves with the information that individual
positions on the two dimensions do not covary much. This result is coherent
with those of linear independence we received from the CS-measures that
were calculated.
The question of linearity. The entire discussion up until now has implic-
itly been based on the assumption that the potential relationship that may
exist between the two dimensions under review, can be described as a linear
one. It was already briefly mentioned that this is not a trivial assumption
and can easily be called into question. Taking a look at a scatter plot of the
Chapel Hill expert survey data on party positions on these two dimensions,
a striking inverted U-shaped curve becomes immediately apparent. The first
question that then needs to be asked is whether this type of relationship is
reproduced at the level of individual citizens. The descriptive analysis of the
EES data for the countries that were looked at for the year 2004 does not
seem to indicate this and a linear relationship does appear plausible. The
immediate question that follows is, of course, why there should be such a
difference between the party and citizen levels, but this shall not be treated
here.
Instead, we take a look more closely at three countries, Austria, Germany
and France17 in an exemplary fashion to show that there is no evidence to
suggest that the linearity assumption is incorrect. Because the variables in
the data set for individual positions on the two dimensions are discrete, a
scatter plot provides no information about their relationship. To circumvent
this problem, I have tabulated (table 10) the mean together with the standard
deviation and median positions on the European integration scale for each
possible position on the left/right scale for the countries in the subsample.
Further, I plotted a smoothed density function in figure 5.4.3, together
17The choice of these three countries is more or less arbitrary
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Table 9: Correlation between left/right and EU integration dimension by
country and year
Correlation Coefficient
Country 1999 2004 2009
Austria -0.1474 -0.1431 -0.1159
(0.0021) (0.0000) (0.0004)
Germany 0.0157 -0.0930 -0.0707
(0.6303) (0.0356) (0.0286)
Denmark 0.1709 0.0033 -0.1042
(0.0000) (0.9093) (0.0011)
Spain 0.0115 -0.0484 -0.0866
(0.7488) (0.1950) (0.0084)
Finland -0.0028 0.1517 0.0529
(0.9567) (0.0000) (0.1025)
France -0.1111 -0.0156 -0.0724
(0.0023) (0.5636) (0.0303)
Great Britain -0.1139 -0.1692 -0.1688
(0.0010) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Greece 0.0226 0.0817 0.0003
(0.6423) (0.0782) (0.9924)
Ireland 0.0081 0.0607 0.0777
(0.8657) (0.0480) (0.0192)
Luxembourg 0.0124 -0.0853 0.0228
(0.8488) (0.0026) (0.4870)
Netherlands -0.0768 -0.0153 -0.0896
(0.0214) (0.5708) (0.0054)
Portugal 0.0535 0.0632 0.0577
(0.3210) (0.0751) (0.1078)
Source: own calculation from EES 1999, 2004 and 2009, p value in brackets below corre-
lation coefficient
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Table 10: Mean and Median EU integration positions for L/R positions:
Austria, France, Germany 2004
L/R Median Mean Std
Austria 1 5 5,39 3,28
2 5 5,68 2,84
3 5 5,39 2,53
4 5 4,75 2,31
5 4 4,41 2,76
6 4 4,29 2,63
7 5 4,53 2,56
8 3 3,36 2,36
9 5 4,78 3,63
10 5 4,35 3,21
Germany 1 5 5,43 3,85
2 5 5,60 2,85
3 6,5 6,04 2,55
4 7 6,50 2,44
5 5 5,14 2,84
6 6 5,46 2,53
7 5 5,16 2,66
8 5 5,32 2,72
9 4,5 4,00 1,93
10 5 5,33 3,53
France 1 5 5,55 3,24
2 6 6,00 2,65
3 6 5,97 2,59
4 6 6,13 2,52
5 5 5,29 2,67
6 5 5,68 2,25
7 6 6,11 2,46
8 5 5,42 2,51
9 6 6,37 2,38
10 5 5,36 2,93
Source: own calculation from EES 2004
80
Figure 6: Smoothed densities and normal approximation of EU integration
positions for each L/R position for France 2004
Source: own calculation from EES 2004
with the normal approximation for France, the choice of France being arbi-
trary. Unlike the measures and graph above, this illustration also provides a
sense of the distribution of the positions on the European integration scale
for each possible position on the left/right scale.
There is no indication in figure 5.4.3, that would give us a good reason
to assume that the relationship between the two dimensions in non-linear.
Despite the distributions varying across the L/R positions, they are not more
similar at the extremities of the left/right scale, than at the centre. Hence
there seems to be no reason not to apply the CS-measure as well as the
correlation coefficient which are based on the linearity assumption.
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5.4.4 Concluding remarks to the necessary conditions
In the previous the subsections, we showed that the necessary conditions
about the supply and demand sides and the political space of our model hold.
As was mentioned in section 4.3, we do not test the necessary condition for
salience of the issue of European integration, because the data and approach
I am applying makes this difficult. Instead, on the one hand we rely on the
convincing conclusions of Franklin and Wlezien [1997] that since the 1980’s
the salience of this issue has been on the increase on the other hand simply on
the results from the empirical analysis in section 6. The theoretical model
stipulates that all necessary conditions have to hold in order for EU issue
voting to take place. We now know that the first of these hold for the data
we are using. What, then, does the necessary condition of issue salience
imply for the research questions and the corresponding hypotheses? This
will be briefly outlined here. For the ensuing discussion we call to mind that
necessary conditions need not inevitably lead to a related effect and that
salience is such a necessary, but not sufficient condition.
The first hypothesis states that European integration impacts on the at-
tractiveness of political parties for citizens. The implication of the existence
of issue salience for this hypothesis is simple and does not require much
discussion. It merely implies that we may see that the issue of European
integration has an effect on the dependent variable.
Positive results for the second hypothesis, that the importance of the
European integration issue for the attractiveness of parties for citizens has
increased over time, could imply that, that if issue salience is present, that
issue salience has increased over time. Due to the study mentioned above by
Franklin and Wlezien [1997] we have reason to believe that this is the case.
However an increase in the salience of EU integration need not necessarily
be the only cause for this.
The second hypothesis can also hold if the salience of the European issue
remains the same over two periods. On the one hand, this could be because
the relative importance of this issue as compared to issues that can be sub-
sumed on the left/right dimension increases; in other words, the salience of
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the left/right issue dimension decreases. On the other hand, it can be be-
cause the positions on the European integration dimension of either political
parties or individuals changes in such a way that the distance between an
individual and a party increases on average whilst the average distance of
on the left/right dimension remains constant. An increase in distance on
the European integration dimension can then potentially render a party less
attractive to individuals (recall that the estimates are conducted separately
for individual political parties). We will not be able to discern between these
two potential causes in the empirical analysis.
For the third hypothesis, that extreme parties profit more from the Euro-
pean integration issue than moderate parties we argued that moderate parties
will have more incentive to try to integrate potentially new issues into old
cleavage structures, that is the left/right dimension, whereas extreme parties
that tend to be smaller will have an interest in trying to create new cleavages.
Because of this, extreme parties will emphasise the new issue more than mod-
erate parties either to make an issue more salient in order to attract voters
for whom the issue is already salient.
Lastly, the fourth hypothesis states that anti-integration positions have a
greater impact on the attractiveness of parties than pro-integration positions.
This idea is directly related to the idea of issue salience in that it assumes that
the issue is more salient for those that are opposed to European integration
as they are unhappy with the status quo.
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6 Empirical Results and Discussion
In this section, we finally present some of the results that were produced
to test the hypotheses. As was already emphasised earlier, due to limits on
space, not all regressions are run for all cases18.
Two types of regressions were set up in section 5.3.3 with the propensity to
vote as the dependent variable (PTV). The first type is described by equation
2 in that section and is constructed to be run separately for each political
party in a country at a given point in time. The explanatory variables are
the absolute distance between a political party and an individual on the
left/right and European integration dimensions (the latter being the main
variable of interest), a dummy variable describing whether an individual is
anti–integrationist or not and further control variables.
The second type of regression are ones calculated for an entire country at
a given point in time, whereby all political parties are included at the same
time. For this type, we differentiated again between two. The first described
by equation 3, introduces an interaction term for extreme parties and the
second, described by equation 5, replaces the interaction term by another
regarding anti–integrationist stances towards the European project.
For the second type of model, regressions are run for all countries and the
full results can be found in Appendix B. For the model of the first kind, where
a separate regression is run for individual political parties, only a small selec-
tion of cases is calculated. These cases include all Austrian political parties,
with the exception of the Austrian Communist Party as well as ten further
political parties. The last ten cases were chosen from a randomly constructed
list of political parties and includes five moderate and five extreme parties.
The list of the party abbreviations and their full names for this sample can
be found in table 57 in Appendix C.
Both types of model are used in the discussion of each of the four hy-
potheses. In what follows the results are put together and discussed. In the
discussion of the results for each individual hypothesis, we will see that not
18There are cases where there are no results for particular years. These are cases where
there was a data problem that could not be resolved.
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all of the three models do equally well.
Table 11 summarises the results for the beta coefficients for both the
left/right and European integration distance variable of the first type of
regression; i.e., individual political party regressions for the reduced sample.
Table 11: Left/Right and EU integration results
1999 2004 2009
l/R EU l/R EU l/R EU
Austria
SPO -0.58∗∗∗ -0.15 -0.7∗∗∗ -0.07 -0.62∗∗∗ -0.2∗∗∗
OVP -0.41∗∗∗ 0.1 -0.69∗∗∗ -0.08 -0.56∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗
GRU -0.67∗∗∗ -0.22∗∗ -0.45∗∗∗ -0.2∗∗∗ -0.62∗∗∗ -0.2∗∗∗
FPO -0.77∗∗∗ -0.1 -0.31∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.47∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗
LIF -0.337∗∗∗ -0.313∗∗∗ – – – –
BZO – – – – -0.43∗∗∗ -0.1∗∗
Finland
VAS -0.48∗∗∗ 0.00121 -0.67∗∗∗ -0.105 -0.67∗∗∗ 0.0242
France
PCF -0.452∗∗∗ -0.0307 -0.375∗∗∗ 0.0563 -0.570∗∗∗ 0.000553
Denmark
KF -0.502∗∗∗ -0.186∗ -0.786∗∗∗ -0.0273 -0.816∗∗∗ -0.0715
Netherlands
LPF – – -0.292∗∗∗ -0.0408 – –
CDA -0.604∗∗∗ 0.0746 -0.906∗∗∗ -0.163 -0.553∗∗∗ -0.269∗∗
Greece
KKE -0.539∗∗∗ 0.0611 -0.410∗∗∗ 0.114 -0.440∗∗∗ -0.131∗
PASOK -0.389∗∗∗ -0.133 -0.549∗∗∗ -0.0333 -0.409∗∗∗ -0.0834
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Luxembourg
DP -0.259 0.0540 – – -0.330∗∗∗ -0.135
Germany
CDU -0.726∗∗∗ 0.116 – – -0.888∗∗∗ -0.148
Portugal
PSD -1.238∗∗∗ 0.191 -0.820∗∗∗ 0.0981 -0.928∗∗∗ 0.159
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Source: own calculation from EES 1999, 2004 and 2009
6.1 H1: Impact EU integration – general
The first hypothesis states that
European integration impacts on the attractiveness of political parties for
citizens.
This hypothesis, being the simplest of the four, does not have to stand any
hard test and as expected it passes. We first look at table 11. We see that,
apart from one case, the coefficient for the distance variable on the left/right
dimension is statistically significant and negative for all parties looked at in
the different survey years. The coefficient for the distance between a party
and an individual with regard to the European integration dimension is not
significant in all cases, but for a large number. The sign is negative on
most of these coefficients, and in the cases where it is not, the result is not
statistically significant.
In sum we can say that this hypothesis stands the test in this model
and the results follow our intuition. The second type of model with its
two subtypes also potentially contains information on this hypothesis and
has the advantage that it was calculated for all countries in the sample.
Looking at the tables in the appendix dealing with these two regressions,
we see immediately that the results are no longer so neat. The sign of the
coefficients for the distance variable on the European integration dimension
is not always negative as we would have expected, and this is also often the
case when the result is statistically significant.
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There are a few countries that “behave well” for both models. For Greece,
Great Britain, the Netherlands and Denmark the coefficients are both nega-
tive and statistically significant in all years. In the cases of some countries,
such as Luxembourg, Ireland, Finland and Spain those coefficients that are
statistically significant in both models are at least negative. Strange results
are visible in the model that contains an interaction term for extreme par-
ties. In this model for countries such as Austria, Germany and France the
coefficient is positive and yet at the same time statistically significant. This
is, to say the least, unexpected and quite odd.
6.2 H2: Impact EU integration – over time
The second hypothesis posits that
The importance of the European integration issue for the attractiveness
of parties for citizens has increased over time.
We begin again by looking at the results in table 11. For the Austrian
political parties, we find that for the Greens (GRU), the Freedom Party
(FPO), the Liberal Forum (LIF) and the Alliance for the Future of Austria
(BZO) the coefficients for the European integration variable are statistically
significant and negative in all the years (the latter two existed only in one of
the years of the surveys). The magnitude of the coefficient in absolute terms
remained more or less constant for the Greens, but rose slightly for the FPO
between the survey years of 2004 and 2009. For the Social Democratic Party
of Austria (SPO) and the Austrian People’s Party (OVP) the coefficients are
significant in the last survey year, 2009. For the case of Austria, we can say
that this hypothesis holds as we saw both a change in the magnitude of the
effect of the European integration dimension and the coefficients becoming
statistically significant were they were not before.
In table 11 we find three more cases where we can observe a change
over time. The first, for the Conservatives (KF) in Denmark, the effect of
European integration was significant in the first survey year, but no longer in
the later two surveys. For the Christian Democrats (CDA) in the Netherlands
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and the Greek Communist Party (KKE) the coefficients are insignificant for
the first two survey years, but then become significant in 2009.
We turn next to the models run across countries. For the model contain-
ing the interaction variable with anti–integration positions the coefficients for
the European integration distance variable is always negative. For Austria,
Finland, Great Britain, Ireland, Greece and Luxembourg an upward trend
in absolute terms over time is discernible. However, for countries such as
Germany and Portugal the trend goes in the opposite direction and for Den-
mark, the Netherlands and France no trend is visible at all. Such changes
could be attributed to the level of salience that the issue of European inte-
gration has at that point in time relative to other issues. But we have no
way to test for this directly in the models. Regarding the statistical signifi-
cance of these coefficients in the country analysis, we find cases where they
become statistically significant at some point, lose statistical significance or
are significant all the time. Thus, there is only evidence for an increase in
importance of this issues in terms of statistical significance in a small number
of countries; namely Austria, Finland and Greece. Looking at the country
regressions with the extreme party interactive variable, we no longer get a
coherent picture. The coefficients for the European integration distance vari-
able fluctuates between positive and negative in different years and different
countries without any pattern being deducable. Even if one could find a
pattern, positive coefficients make little sense.
In total, the regressions run for the subsample of political parties and the
first of the two country models provide some evidence that the importance of
the European integration issue has increased over time in some countries and
for some political parties. However, in the country analysis we also found
that in some countries the importance of this issue may have changed over
time, but not necessarily increased. We attributed this to changes in salience
of the issue relative to other issues. A more detailed cross country analysis
would be required to follow up on the causes for this variance in results. The
second country model, however, provided us with no useful information.
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6.3 H3: Extreme parties
The third hypothesis states that
extreme parties profit more from the European integration issue than mod-
erate parties.
To specifically test for this we introduced an interaction variable βect ,
which is constructed with the distance variable on the European integration
dimension and a dummy variable for extreme parties, where extreme parties
receive the value of 1 and moderate parties a value of 0. A party is viewed
as extreme if it lies at least one standard deviation from the mean position
of political parties in that country on the left/right dimension (see section
5.3.3 for details on the construction of this variable). These regressions can
obviously no longer be run individually for political parties as this variable
will not vary for a party in a given survey year. The results are summarised
in table 12. The Detailed regression results for each country can be found in
Appendix B.
Table 12: Results extreme parties
Interaction coefficient for extreme parties
Country 1999 2004 2009
Austria 0.127∗∗ -0.667∗∗∗ -0.472∗∗∗
Germany -0.638∗∗∗ -0.300∗∗∗ 0.0508
Denmark -0.0553∗∗ -0.189∗∗∗ 0.0502
Spain 0.478∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗
Finland 0.217∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗
France -0.333∗∗∗ -0.411∗∗∗ -0.307∗∗∗
Great Britain -0.0822∗ -0.124∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗
Greece 0.232∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.0363
Ireland 0.0704 0.0609 0.121∗∗∗
Luxembourg 0.170∗∗ – 0.165∗∗∗
Netherlands 0.0862∗∗∗ 0.366∗∗∗ 0.0261
Portugal -0.450∗∗∗ -0.0675∗ 0.0377
Source: own calculation from EES 1999, 2004 and 2009
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We said that the regression coefficients for the interaction variable are
expected to be statistically significant, if on average the European integration
dimension counts more for parties that were found to be extreme on the left
right dimension. Further, we said that we expect these to be negative. We
imagine that this would be the case, because the interaction variable consists
of the dummy variable with the categorisation of a political party as extreme
or not and the individual distance between political parties and individuals
on the European integration dimension.
Taking a look at the results summarised in table 12, we see that these are
rather mixed. Most of the coefficients are statistically significant, even highly
so. However, only the small majority of them displays the negative sign that
we expected. France is, in fact, the only of the countries in the sample where
the results are exactly what we would expect. For this country, in all the
survey years the coefficients are negative and statistically significant.
In Spain and Finland, the results go in the entirely opposite direction.
The coefficients are statistically significant, but positive. In light of our
expectations and argument, this result is rather odd. There appears no
immediate intuitive explanation as to why an extreme political party should
be rewarded for having a position further away from that of an individual on
the European integration scale.
In some countries the results are more encouraging than these. In Ger-
many and Denmark, for example, the coefficients are negative and statisti-
cally significant in 1999 and 2004. In 2009 they become positive, but also
lose their statistical significance. This could be interpreted as the European
integration dimension no longer being important when evaluating political
parties. However, the results for Greece go in entirely the opposite direction.
The results for Great Britain are similar, but the coefficient becomes pos-
itive in 2009 without losing its statistical significance. The coefficients are
statistically significant for the first two survey years and then no longer in
2009. Yet, they are positive. With such mixed results, it is difficult if not
impossible, to make any general conclusions about whether extreme parties
benefit more on average from the European integration dimension or not.
This model gave us trouble already for the first two hypotheses. The most
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plausible conclusion is a methodological not substantive one. It appears that
this model is simply ’bad’. The reasons for this would merit further analysis.
We now look at the model that runs individual regressions for each po-
litical party, the results of which are summarised in table 11. We have no
way to integrate the concept of extreme parties directly into this model. In-
stead, we look at the results in table 11 in light of the categorisation of the
parties as extreme or moderate. Whether the respective parties are extreme
or moderate is shown in table 13.
Table 13: Extreme and Moderate Parties
Abbreviation Extreme/Moderate
Austria
GRU ext
SPO mod
FPO ext
LIF mod
OVP mod
BZO ext
Finland
VAS ext
France
PCF ext
Denmark
KF ext
Netherlands
LPF ext
CDA mod
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Abbreviation Extreme/Moderate
Greece
KKE ext
PASOK mod
Luxembourg
DP mod
Germany
CDU mod
Portugal
PSD mod
In Austria, the two moderate parties, SPO and OVP, only show statisti-
cally significant effects for the European integration dimension in the 2009
survey, whereas for the right extreme party, FPO, and the left extreme party,
GRU, the coefficients are already statistically significant in earlier surveys. In
addition to this, the effect size for the latter two parties is on average larger
than for the two moderate parties. As we already discussed earlier, there are
only two political parties in the rest of the subsample for which the relevant
coefficient is statistically significant. These would be the Dutch CDA and
the Greek KKE in 2009. This is not much evidence for the hypothesis, but
it also does not give us any indication that we should have to refute it.
6.4 H4:Anti–integration positions
Anti-integration positions have a greater impact on individual preferences
over parties than pro-integration positions.
To test whether anti–integration positions have a greater impact on indi-
vidual attitudes to parties with regards to the European integration dimen-
sion than more pro–integration positions, we proposed two different methods
to investigate this question. The first, was to include a dummy variable
for anti–integrationist positions in the regressions run for individual parties.
The second was to run a separate regression for every country, including all
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political parties, with an interaction variable that captures this idea. The
interaction variable consists of a dummy variable that categorised individuals
as pro– or anti–integrationist.
Table 14 summarises the results for the regressions with the anti–integrationsist
interaction variable. The results for this are even more odd, than those for
hypothesis 3, because in this case they are systematically counter–intuitive.
All statistically significant coefficients for the interaction term are positive
and the statistically significant coefficients are numerous. This would imply
that individuals that are opposed to further European integration reward
political parties for being further away from their most preferred position on
the European integration dimension.
Because a measure for being pro– or anti–integrationist can be attributed
to each individual respondent in a survey, we were able to integrate this
variable into the model that looks at political parties individually. The co-
efficients for this variable from these regressions are to be found in table
15.
Table 14: Results anti–integration
Interaction coefficient for anti–integration position
Country 1999 2004 2009
Austria -0.0444 0.114∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗
Germany 0.249∗∗∗ -0.0301 -0.0606
Denmark 0.122∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
Spain 0.228∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗
Finland -0.0202 0.106∗∗∗ 0.0459
France 0.128∗∗∗ 0.0414 0.185∗∗∗
Great Britain 0.192∗∗∗ 0.0512 0.146∗∗∗
Greece 0.100∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.0664∗∗
Ireland 0.142∗∗∗ -0.00634 0.129∗∗∗
Luxembourg 0.162∗∗ – 0.375∗∗∗
Netherlands 0.270∗∗∗ 0.0635∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
Portugal 0.0796 0.134∗∗∗ -0.0225
Source: own calculation from EES 1999, 2004 and 2009
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Table 15: Anti–integration coefficient results
1999 2004 2009
Austria
SPO -0.0106 -0.569∗ -1.604∗∗∗
OVP -0.709 0.336 0.191
GRU -1.351∗∗∗ -1.708∗∗∗ -1.604∗∗∗
FPO 1.258∗∗∗ 0.463∗ 1.485∗∗∗
LIF -0.811∗∗ – –
BZO – – 0.733∗∗
Finland
VAS -0.0612 -0.202 -0.0228
France
PCF 0.0371 -0.200 0.104
Denmark
KF -0.365 -0.238 -0.0651
Netherlands
LPF – 0.548∗∗∗ –
CDA -0.553 -0.124 0.184
Greece
KKE 1.053∗ 0.800 -0.0705
PASOK 0.120 -0.675 -0.229
Luxembourg
DP 0.712 – 0.280
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1999 2004 2009
Germany
CDU -0.145 – -0.0923
Portugal
PSD -1.142 -0.783∗ -0.467
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Source: own calculation from EES 1999, 2004 and 2009
These results look a lot more as we would expect them too, although
not for every case. For the Austrian Green and Socialist parties and the
Portuguese PSD we find statistically significant results that are negative.
However, we find other cases such as the Austrian FPO, the Dutch LPF and
the Greek KKE, where the coefficient is significant but positive. Generally,
most of the coefficients are not significant.
I think it would not be justified to say that evidence was found to support
the claim of the hypothesis. Although, there are single cases which support
the idea set up by the hypothesis, there are others that contradict it just as
much. In particular, these results that contradict it are counter-intuitive and
one would first have to explain why such cases occur before one comes up
with any stronger conclusions than the one we just made.
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6.5 Concluding remarks
The preceding discussion presented mixed results for the hypotheses we
tested. The first, a simple hypothesis, that EU integration can affect the
evaluation of political parties by individuals was easily shown to hold. The
second hypothesis added a time element to the first in that it stated that such
observed effects should increase over time. For this we found some evidence,
but the trends did not always exhibit the same patterns. The formulation of
this hypothesis, or even research question, should probably be rephrased to
include the concept of salience. The salience of issues need to be seen relative
to one another and not in absolute terms. The fluctuations we saw in the
analysis for the second hypothesis were probably reflections of changes in the
salience of the European integration issue relative to others. Testing for the
third hypothesis about the effect of European integration for extreme parties
on the left/right scale being stronger than for moderate parties, proved to be
more difficult than for the first two. We concluded that with the evidence we
produced with the models, that the hypothesis can neither be confirmed nor
rejected. For the last hypothesis dealing with the effects of anti–integrationist
positions of individuals in relation to the European integration dimension we
found no evidence as the results were of such a nature that they contradicted
one another.
Three different models were used to test the four hypotheses set up for the
research questions of the thesis. We divided these into two types, where the
first ran regressions for individual political parties and the second, containing
two of the models, ran regressions for an entire country at one point in time.
For the first of the two types only a small subset of the sample was used.
We found that this model produced results that we expected. The results
produced by the other two models varied a lot more across countries and
time periods and some of the results were entirely counter–intuitive. Can
we, on the basis of this, make any conclusions about the models? Only very
tentatively, seeing that the subsample used for the first model was rather
small. However, it does appear, in light of the results, that this model is to
be preferred above the other two that ran regressions over entire countries.
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Between the latter two, the model which integrated the dummy variable
pertaining to whether an individual was classed as pro– or ant–integrationsist
delivered more intuitive results than the model that integrated an interaction
variable with extreme parties. There was an important difference between
the two latter models in that the interaction terms in the one were attached to
individuals, whereas in the second they were attached to political parties. It
is conceivable that this could make a difference for the validity of the results.
Furthermore, when comparing these two models to the first type of model
that looked at parties individually, one can raise the question of whether
grouping the actors (political parties) together as we did in the second type
of model, leads one to lose some information which leads to the distortion of
results. In essence, by running one regression for a country the results can tell
us only what to expect on average across parties and individual information
is lost. Whether this considerations will lead anywhere is left as an open
question for future research.
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7 Conclusion
The thesis set out to explore whether the issue of European integration af-
fects political contestation at the national level in a context where national
governments represent their country in the supranational institution of the
European Union. Because policies at the national level are more and more,
both directly and indirectly, affected by European integration, one can expect
that it will also have an impact on the relationship between the electorate
in member states and their national representatives which they choose in
national elections.
The literature reviewed for the thesis mostly looks at this potential phe-
nomenon within the framework of spatial voting models. This thesis deviates
from this approach in that it sets up a two step electoral choice model which
explicitly differentiates between the attractiveness of choice options and ac-
tual choice. The question then asked by the research questions is if and how
much the attractiveness or utility that individuals attach to political parties
is affected by their own preferences and the positions of political parties on
the issue of European integration. As a measure for the utility, the propen-
sity to vote [van der Eijk et al., 2006] for a party is used and applied as the
dependent variable in the analyses.
The theoretical framework set up for the analyses, is a rational choice
framework. Political contestation is viewed as taking place within a space
composed of issue dimensions in which political parties and voters interact.
Much attention is paid to the conditions under which one may expect the
European issue dimension to affect the relationship between the represen-
tatives and the represented in the member states of the European Union.
Six conditions were required, five of which were subjected to empirical test.
According to these necessary conditions, citizens must have manifest pref-
erences and political parties positions on the issue of European integration
and both of these must exhibit sufficient variance. This was tested for with
data, as all empirical analyses in this thesis, from the European Election
surveys. It was found that individuals do indeed have real preferences on
and political parties positions regarding European integration. These were
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found to vary not much less, in the case of citizens even more, than positions
on the traditional left/right scale. A further necessary condition, on which
much time was spent in this thesis, is that the European political space be
two dimensional composed of the independent left/right and European inte-
gration dimensions. It was shown that the European political space can be
viewed as a two dimensional space. The last necessary condition, the salience
of European integration dimension, was theoretically required but not tested
for empirically. The results in the empirical section emphasised the probable
import of this condition.
Two different types of model were used to test the four hypotheses con-
structed. The first type of model investigated political parties individually in
countries for the different survey years. The second type of model were aggre-
gate models over countries. We constructed two types of aggregate models,
one with an interaction variable using a dummy for extreme political parties
and one with an interaction term splitting the sample into individuals with
pro– and anti–integrationist attitudes. The results produced by the individ-
ual party and country pro–/anti–integrationist models for the issue distance
variables (left/right and European integration) produced more or less what
was expected. The results produced by the different models diverged when it
came to the questions of whether the European integration dimension made
a greater difference for the evaluation of political parties when taking ac-
count of whether political parties are extreme or not on the left/right issue
dimension and whether individuals are pro– or anti–integrationist. We found
that the results from the first model (here we only ran regressions for a sub-
sample due to space constraints) fitted our intuition better than the results
produced by the second. From this we concluded that the first type of model
is a better model than the second. The question of why this may be the case,
we did not answer. Instead we leave it as an open methodological question.
This question is quite relevant, because the second type of model is the type
of model that has been applied in the majority of the studies that were con-
ducted in this area of political science. As the first type of model treating
political parties separately fares better on all accounts and most of the liter-
ature that was reviewed for the thesis applies aggregate country model, it is
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suggested that a closer look at the effects of different types of models would
have value.
The results obtained in the empirical analysis of the research questions
presented mixed results. The first question of whether national political par-
ties can potentially capitalise on the European integration dimension was
answered in the positive. This does not imply that every political party can
gain votes from a position on this issue dimension, but that the potential
does exist and that some parties already gain in favour among citizens be-
cause of it. The second research question asking if the effects of integration
has changed, more specifically increased over time, was supported by some
evidence. But it was concluded that there is no systematic pattern present
that shows a continuous increase in the importance of the EU integration
issue over time. Instead much variance was found across countries and time
and the hypothesis was set up that the factor of issue salience not directly
integrated into the models, may account for much of the observed variance.
The third research question wished to establish whether political par-
ties that can be categorised as extreme with regards to their position on
the left/right issue dimension would profit more from the issue of European
integration than moderate parties. For this we found neither evidence to sup-
port or refute this idea. The final research question, pursuing the question
of whether individuals that are anti–integrationist place greater importance
on the European integration dimension led to a dead end. The results of the
analysis were conflicting and unsystematic. For this question we could pro-
vide no answer at all and found no indication of a possible answer. Therefore,
this question, still being interesting, should probably be approached differ-
ently to the way in which it was done in this thesis.
In sum, the thesis found that the conditions for issue of European inte-
gration to make its way into the political contestation at the national level
in respect to the relationship between citizens and their representatives are
present. In addition to this, not only do the conditions for this exist, but one
can already see this phenomenon in action. In other words, the question is
no longer whether the sleeping giant is awake, he is, but rather how big he
is.
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Appendix A Regression results per political
party per country and year
This appendix lists all detailed regression results that are presented in sum-
marised form in the empirical section of the main text. Table 16 gives the
descriptions of the variables in the regressions that follow in this appendix.
Note: Social class self–placements are dummy variables and the not in-
cluded variable for working class acts as the base category.
Table 16: Variable Description
Variable Description
d lr ij absolute value of distance between party and
individual on left/right scale
d eu ij absolute value of distance between party and
individual on European integration scale
anti i dummy for individual anti–integration position
ees soclass lower middle self–placement: lower middle class
ees soclass middle self–placement: middle class
ees soclass upper self–placement: upper class
ees soclass upper middle self–placement: upper middle class
ees sex gender
cons constant
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In the following, the regression outputs for each political party included in
the analysis per country and survey year are displayed. Each table contains
the results for an individual party for 1999, 2004 and 2009. The titles of
the table contain the party abbreviations and their English full names can
be found in Appendix C. The dependet variable is not given in the tables to
save space, but is in each case the propensity to vote (PTV).
Appendix A.1 Austria
Table 17: Regression results Austria: SPO
1999 2004 2009
d lr ij 0.0102 -0.350∗∗∗ -0.686∗∗∗
d eu ij -0.208 0.0860 -0.126
anti i -0.0106 -0.569∗ -1.604∗∗∗
ees soclass lower middle -1.511∗ -1.517∗∗∗ 1.449∗∗∗
ees soclass middle -1.097∗∗ -1.195∗∗∗ 1.243∗∗∗
ees soclass upper -3.301∗ -2.178∗ 0.706
ees soclass upper middle -1.679∗∗ -1.720∗∗∗ 1.449∗∗∗
ees sex 0.0533 -0.161 0.666∗∗
cons 7.041∗∗∗ 7.665∗∗∗ 5.146∗∗∗
N 417 915 886
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 18: Regression results Austria: OVP
1999 2004 2009
d lr ij -0.256∗ -0.777∗∗∗ -0.565∗∗∗
d eu ij 0.0431 -0.243∗∗ -0.329∗∗∗
anti i -0.709 0.336 0.191
ees soclass lower middle 0.637 0.677 0.712
ees soclass middle 0.277 0.609∗ 0.971∗∗
ees soclass upper 3.055∗ 1.402 1.654
ees soclass upper middle 0.756 1.158∗∗ 1.657∗∗∗
ees sex 0.255 0.0402 -0.301
cons 5.189∗∗∗ 6.313∗∗∗ 6.821∗∗∗
N 416 914 883
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 19: Regression results Austria: GRU
1999 2004 2009
d lr ij -0.568∗∗∗ -0.427∗∗∗ -0.686∗∗∗
d eu ij 0.218∗ 0.129 -0.126
anti i -1.351∗∗∗ -1.708∗∗∗ -1.604∗∗∗
ees soclass lower middle 0.821 1.080∗∗ 1.449∗∗∗
ees soclass middle 1.240∗∗ 1.414∗∗∗ 1.243∗∗∗
ees soclass upper 2.346 0.864 0.706
ees soclass upper middle 1.606∗∗ 1.667∗∗∗ 1.449∗∗∗
ees sex 1.066∗∗∗ 0.348 0.666∗∗
cons 3.848∗∗∗ 4.749∗∗∗ 5.146∗∗∗
N 411 915 886
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 20: Regression results Austria: FPO
1999 2004 2009
d lr ij -0.686∗∗∗ -0.346∗∗∗ -0.495∗∗∗
d eu ij -0.0156 -0.0458 0.0212
anti i 1.258∗∗∗ 0.463∗ 1.485∗∗∗
ees soclass lower middle -0.343 -0.187 -0.959∗
ees soclass middle -0.549 -0.353 -1.209∗∗∗
ees soclass upper -1.535 0.243 0.108
ees soclass upper middle -0.464 -0.430 -1.478∗∗∗
ees sex -0.636∗ -0.254 -0.0410
cons 5.783∗∗∗ 3.707∗∗∗ 4.101∗∗∗
N 414 915 885
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 21: Regression results Austria: LIF
1999
d lr ij -0.302∗∗
d eu ij -0.00531
anti i -0.811∗∗
ees soclass lower middle 0.700
ees soclass middle 0.812∗
ees soclass upper 1.219
ees soclass upper middle 1.643∗∗∗
ees sex 0.289
cons 2.672∗∗∗
N 411
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 22: Regression results Austria: BZO
2009
d lr ij -0.434∗∗∗
d eu ij -0.0763
anti i 0.733∗∗
ees soclass lower middle -0.490
ees soclass middle -0.547∗
ees soclass upper 0.0858
ees soclass upper middle -0.779∗
ees sex -0.249
cons 3.355∗∗∗
N 886
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
111
Appendix A.2 10 randomly selected cases
Table 23: Regression results Finland: VAS
1999 2004 2009
d lr ij -0.480∗∗∗ -0.673∗∗∗ -0.672∗∗∗
d eu ij 0.00121 -0.105 0.0242
anti i -0.0612 -0.202 -0.0228
ees soclass lower middle -0.241 -0.521 -0.963∗∗∗
ees soclass middle -0.820∗ -0.707∗∗ -1.293∗∗∗
ees soclass upper -2.262 -1.388 -0.0448
ees soclass upper middle -1.147∗ -0.744∗ -1.245∗∗∗
ees sex -0.266 0.123 -0.0226
cons 5.852∗∗∗ 6.490∗∗∗ 6.386∗∗∗
N 318 784 922
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 24: Regression results France: PCF
1999 2004 2009
d lr ij -0.452∗∗∗ -0.375∗∗∗ -0.570∗∗∗
d eu ij -0.0307 0.0563 0.000553
anti i 0.0371 -0.200 0.104
ees soclass lower middle -0.957∗ -0.681∗∗ -1.015∗∗∗
ees soclass middle -0.269 -0.906∗∗∗ -0.808∗∗∗
ees soclass upper -0.473 -1.316∗∗∗ -1.482∗∗
ees soclass upper middle -0.709∗ -1.340∗∗∗ -1.506∗∗∗
ees sex 0.0923 0.278∗ 0.0818
cons 4.668∗∗∗ 4.323∗∗∗ 4.616∗∗∗
N 627 1364 847
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 25: Regression results Denmark: KF
1999 2004 2009
d lr ij -0.502∗∗∗ -0.786∗∗∗ -0.816∗∗∗
d eu ij -0.186∗ -0.0273 -0.0715
anti i -0.365 -0.238 -0.0651
ees soclass lower middle -0.183 0.732∗ 0.560
ees soclass middle 0.751∗∗ 1.226∗∗∗ 0.893∗∗
ees soclass upper 0.688 1.532∗ 1.117
ees soclass upper middle 1.253∗∗∗ 1.994∗∗∗ 1.448∗∗∗
ees sex -0.392∗ -0.417∗ -0.400∗
cons 4.872∗∗∗ 5.296∗∗∗ 5.414∗∗∗
N 867 1126 969
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 26: Regression results Netherlands: LPF
2004
d lr ij -0.292∗∗∗
d eu ij -0.0408
anti i 0.548∗∗∗
ees soclass lower middle -0.292
ees soclass middle -0.207
ees soclass upper -0.395
ees soclass upper middle -0.256
ees sex -0.125
cons 3.348∗∗∗
N 1206
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 27: Regression results Greece: KKE
1999 2004 2009
d lr ij -0.539∗∗∗ -0.410∗∗∗ -0.440∗∗∗
d eu ij 0.0611 0.114 -0.131∗
anti i 1.053∗ 0.800 -0.0705
ees soclass lower middle -0.228 -0.985∗ -0.902∗
ees soclass middle -0.820∗ -0.366 -1.041∗∗∗
ees soclass upper -1.924 -1.184 -0.717
ees soclass upper middle -1.746∗∗∗ -1.142∗ -1.492∗∗∗
ees sex 0.157 0.263 0.300
cons 5.381∗∗∗ 4.304∗∗∗ 5.406∗∗∗
N 404 445 897
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 28: Regression results Luxembourg: DP
1999 2009
d lr ij -0.259 -0.330∗∗∗
d eu ij 0.0540 -0.135
anti i 0.712 0.280
ees soclass lower middle 0.794 0.0140
ees soclass middle 1.317∗ 0.797∗
ees soclass upper 3.843∗ 1.469∗
ees soclass upper middle 1.757∗ 1.212∗∗∗
ees sex 0.0175 0.186
cons 3.738∗∗∗ 4.387∗∗∗
N 213 852
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 29: Regression results Netherlands: CDA
1999 2004 2009
d lr ij -0.604∗∗∗ -0.906∗∗∗ -0.553∗∗∗
d eu ij 0.0746 -0.163 -0.269∗∗
anti i -0.553 -0.124 0.184
ees soclass lower middle 0.470 0.120 1.270∗∗
ees soclass middle 0.366 0.638∗ 0.693∗
ees soclass upper -0.697 0.147 -0.00507
ees soclass upper middle -0.377 0.293 0.959∗∗
ees sex 0.235 0.0547 -0.0314
cons 5.868∗∗∗ 6.447∗∗∗ 6.112∗∗∗
N 868 1257 927
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 30: Regression results Germany: CDU
1999 2009
d lr ij -0.726∗∗∗ -0.888∗∗∗
d eu ij 0.116 -0.148
anti i -0.145 -0.0923
ees soclass lower middle 0.0382 0.196
ees soclass middle 0.734∗∗ 0.639∗
ees soclass upper 1.561 1.605
ees soclass upper middle 1.233∗∗∗ 1.191∗∗
ees sex -0.339 0.173
cons 7.231∗∗∗ 7.377∗∗∗
N 925 924
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 31: Regression results Greece: PASOK
1999 2004 2009
d lr ij -0.389∗∗∗ -0.549∗∗∗ -0.409∗∗∗
d eu ij -0.133 -0.0333 -0.0834
anti i 0.120 -0.675 -0.229
ees soclass lower middle -0.310 0.299 0.656
ees soclass middle -0.712 0.0262 -0.302
ees soclass upper -3.353 1.703 -1.130
ees soclass upper middle 0.0906 0.612 -0.986
ees sex 0.0954 1.143∗∗∗ -0.136
cons 6.531∗∗∗ 5.896∗∗∗ 5.689∗∗∗
N 405 447 895
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 32: Regression results Portugal: PSD
1999 2004 2009
d lr ij -1.238∗∗∗ -0.820∗∗∗ -0.928∗∗∗
d eu ij 0.191 0.0981 0.159
anti i -1.142 -0.783∗ -0.467
ees soclass lower middle -0.0845 0.594 0.272
ees soclass middle -0.154 0.541 0.536
ees soclass upper 3.700 2.188 -2.326
ees soclass upper middle 1.232 0.807 1.856∗∗∗
ees sex 0.121 -0.0900 -0.134
cons 7.502∗∗∗ 6.994∗∗∗ 6.889∗∗∗
N 343 761 742
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Appendix B Regression results for country
regressions
Appendix B.1 Austria
Table 33: Regression results Austria: extreme parties
1999 2004 2009
d lr ij -0.390∗∗∗ -0.515∗∗∗ -0.489∗∗∗
d eu ij -0.0912∗ 0.216∗∗∗ 0.00609
int ext 0.127∗∗ -0.667∗∗∗ -0.472∗∗∗
ees soclass lower middle 0.0963 0.126 0.114
ees soclass middle 0.137 0.299∗ -0.0840
ees soclass upper 0.485 0.788 0.348
ees soclass upper middle 0.405 0.429∗ -0.0482
ees sex 0.183 -0.0763 -0.116
cons 4.437∗∗∗ 5.001∗∗∗ 5.058∗∗∗
N 2462 4544 6173
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 34: Regression results Austria: anti–EU position
1999 2004 2009
d lr ij -0.369∗∗∗ -0.676∗∗∗ -0.582∗∗∗
d eu ij -0.0216 -0.110∗∗∗ -0.311∗∗∗
int anti -0.0444 0.114∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗
ees soclass lower middle 0.0979 0.0797 0.0970
ees soclass middle 0.133 0.209 -0.0951
ees soclass upper 0.467 0.721 0.382
ees soclass upper middle 0.386 0.270 -0.0615
ees sex 0.188 -0.0536 -0.119
cons 4.387∗∗∗ 5.468∗∗∗ 5.324∗∗∗
N 2462 4544 6173
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Appendix B.2 Germany
Table 35: Regression results Germany: extreme parties
1999 2004 2009
d lr ij -0.395∗∗∗ -0.368∗∗∗ -0.727∗∗∗
d eu ij 0.187∗∗∗ 0.00479 -0.178∗∗∗
int ext -0.638∗∗∗ -0.300∗∗∗ 0.0508
ees soclass lower middle 0.250∗ 0.470∗ 0.0362
ees soclass middle 0.338∗∗∗ 0.191 0.186
ees soclass upper 0.403 0.811 0.869∗
ees soclass upper middle 0.518∗∗∗ 0.237 0.425∗
ees sex 0.0463 0.288∗∗ 0.0424
cons 4.498∗∗∗ 4.272∗∗∗ 6.072∗∗∗
N 5552 2465 4620
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 36: Regression results Germany: anti–EU position
1999 2004 2009
d lr ij -0.442∗∗∗ -0.419∗∗∗ -0.720∗∗∗
d eu ij -0.352∗∗∗ -0.216∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗
int anti 0.249∗∗∗ -0.0301 -0.0606
ees soclass lower middle 0.212 0.447∗ 0.0134
ees soclass middle 0.303∗∗ 0.146 0.166
ees soclass upper 0.318 0.936 0.875∗
ees soclass upper middle 0.539∗∗∗ 0.201 0.394∗
ees sex 0.0192 0.305∗∗ 0.0481
cons 5.151∗∗∗ 4.508∗∗∗ 6.039∗∗∗
N 5552 2465 4620
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Appendix B.3 Denmark
Table 37: Regression results Denmark: extreme parties
1999 2004 2009
d lr ij -0.287∗∗∗ -0.752∗∗∗ -0.647∗∗∗
d eu ij -0.188∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗ -0.228∗∗∗
int ext -0.0553∗∗ -0.189∗∗∗ 0.0502
ees soclass lower middle 0.140 0.101 0.493∗∗
ees soclass middle 0.185∗ 0.135 -0.0136
ees soclass upper 0.0912 0.240 0.224
ees soclass upper middle 0.0355 0.196 -0.0602
ees sex 0.0630 -0.138 -0.0980
cons 4.450∗∗∗ 6.564∗∗∗ 5.472∗∗∗
N 10371 6772 7734
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 38: Regression results Denmark: anti–EU position
1999 2004 2009
d lr ij -0.287∗∗∗ -0.766∗∗∗ -0.640∗∗∗
d eu ij -0.277∗∗∗ -0.366∗∗∗ -0.259∗∗∗
int anti 0.122∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
ees soclass lower middle 0.183 0.172 0.510∗∗
ees soclass middle 0.225∗∗ 0.218∗ 0.0246
ees soclass upper 0.149 0.265 0.311
ees soclass upper middle 0.133 0.320∗∗ 0.000302
ees sex 0.0490 -0.146∗ -0.109
cons 4.435∗∗∗ 6.635∗∗∗ 5.448∗∗∗
N 10371 6772 7734
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Appendix B.4 Spain
Table 39: Regression results Spain: extreme parties
1999 2004 2009
d lr ij -0.325∗∗∗ -0.665∗∗∗ -0.284∗∗∗
d eu ij -0.298∗∗∗ -0.0634 -0.304∗∗∗
int ext 0.478∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗
ees soclass lower middle -0.165 0.222 -0.313∗∗
ees soclass middle -0.0439 0.220 -0.173∗
ees soclass upper 0.173 1.319 0.0925
ees soclass upper middle 0.0294 0.636∗ -0.462∗∗∗
ees sex 0.135 0.117 -0.146∗
cons 4.406∗∗∗ 4.599∗∗∗ 3.825∗∗∗
N 4399 3928 8505
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 40: Regression results Spain: anti–EU position
1999 2004 2009
d lr ij -0.255∗∗∗ -0.586∗∗∗ -0.241∗∗∗
d eu ij -0.223∗∗∗ -0.00179 -0.253∗∗∗
int anti 0.228∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗
ees soclass lower middle -0.151 0.234 -0.336∗∗
ees soclass middle -0.0326 0.197 -0.174∗
ees soclass upper 0.442 1.109 0.107
ees soclass upper middle 0.0381 0.633∗ -0.412∗∗
ees sex 0.0417 0.126 -0.162∗
cons 4.363∗∗∗ 4.472∗∗∗ 3.727∗∗∗
N 4399 3928 8505
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Appendix B.5 Finland
Table 41: Regression results Finland: extreme parties
1999 2004 2009
d lr ij -0.463∗∗∗ -0.544∗∗∗ -0.602∗∗∗
d eu ij -0.0982∗ -0.173∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗
int ext 0.217∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗
ees soclass lower middle -0.0893 -0.00492 0.0984
ees soclass middle -0.263 0.136 -0.0518
ees soclass upper -0.383 0.148 -0.198
ees soclass upper middle 0.169 0.421∗∗∗ -0.00791
ees sex 0.0176 0.275∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗
cons 5.559∗∗∗ 5.085∗∗∗ 5.472∗∗∗
N 2523 6257 7392
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 42: Regression results Finland: anti–EU position
1999 2004 2009
d lr ij -0.435∗∗∗ -0.497∗∗∗ -0.547∗∗∗
d eu ij -0.0285 -0.182∗∗∗ -0.172∗∗∗
int anti -0.0202 0.106∗∗∗ 0.0459
ees soclass lower middle -0.0842 0.0271 0.123
ees soclass middle -0.266 0.177 -0.0260
ees soclass upper -0.391 0.262 -0.262
ees soclass upper middle 0.148 0.470∗∗∗ 0.0162
ees sex 0.0233 0.259∗∗∗ 0.194∗
cons 5.488∗∗∗ 4.983∗∗∗ 5.338∗∗∗
N 2523 6257 7392
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Appendix B.6 France
Table 43: Regression results France: extreme parties
1999 2004 2009
d lr ij -0.558∗∗∗ -0.557∗∗∗ -0.624∗∗∗
d eu ij 0.0529∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗
int ext -0.333∗∗∗ -0.411∗∗∗ -0.307∗∗∗
ees soclass lower middle -0.352∗ -0.105 -0.399∗∗
ees soclass middle -0.0293 -0.0160 -0.278∗
ees soclass upper -0.0853 -0.0825 -0.668∗∗
ees soclass upper middle -0.359∗∗ -0.0489 -0.550∗∗∗
ees sex 0.259∗∗∗ -0.0188 0.208∗∗
cons 5.431∗∗∗ 5.709∗∗∗ 5.481∗∗∗
N 5578 8183 5832
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 44: Regression results France: anti–EU position
1999 2004 2009
d lr ij -0.587∗∗∗ -0.597∗∗∗ -0.681∗∗∗
d eu ij -0.146∗∗∗ -0.183∗∗∗ -0.162∗∗∗
int anti 0.128∗∗∗ 0.0414 0.185∗∗∗
ees soclass lower middle -0.293 -0.147 -0.413∗∗
ees soclass middle 0.00533 -0.0528 -0.266∗
ees soclass upper 0.00934 -0.0999 -0.604∗
ees soclass upper middle -0.319∗∗ -0.102 -0.524∗∗∗
ees sex 0.242∗∗∗ -0.0355 0.200∗
cons 5.596∗∗∗ 5.998∗∗∗ 5.656∗∗∗
N 5578 8183 5832
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Appendix B.7 Great Britain
Table 45: Regression results Great Britain: extreme parties
1999 2004 2009
d lr ij -0.176∗∗∗ -0.243∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗
d eu ij -0.0539∗ -0.149∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗
int ext -0.0822∗ -0.124∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗
ees soclass lower middle -0.157 0.104 0.00492
ees soclass middle 0.0579 0.144 0.0295
o.ees soclass upper 0 -0.723 6.537∗∗∗
ees soclass upper middle -0.0541 0.401 0.203
ees sex 0.0848 0.142 0.296∗∗∗
cons 4.014∗∗∗ 5.227∗∗∗ 3.632∗∗∗
N 5173 4757 6717
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 46: Regression results Great Britain: anti–EU position
1999 2004 2009
d lr ij -0.198∗∗∗ -0.248∗∗∗ -0.223∗∗∗
d eu ij -0.131∗∗∗ -0.226∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗
int anti 0.192∗∗∗ 0.0512 0.146∗∗∗
ees soclass lower middle -0.150 0.105 0.0322
ees soclass middle 0.103 0.144 0.0625
o.ees soclass upper 0 -0.712 7.200∗∗∗
ees soclass upper middle 0.0688 0.390 0.160
ees sex 0.120 0.142 0.294∗∗∗
cons 3.956∗∗∗ 5.211∗∗∗ 3.618∗∗∗
N 5173 4757 6717
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Appendix B.8 Greece
Table 47: Regression results Greece: extreme parties
1999 2004 2009
d lr ij -0.488∗∗∗ -0.556∗∗∗ -0.569∗∗∗
d eu ij -0.195∗∗∗ -0.297∗∗∗ -0.0784∗∗
int ext 0.232∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.0363
ees soclass lower middle 0.245 -0.227 -0.126
ees soclass middle -0.169 0.0359 -0.170
ees soclass upper -0.216 -0.218 -0.195
ees soclass upper middle -0.155 0.0977 -0.394∗
ees sex 0.154 0.238 0.122
cons 5.250∗∗∗ 5.914∗∗∗ 4.947∗∗∗
N 2830 2227 5377
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 48: Regression results Greece: anti–EU position
1999 2004 2009
d lr ij -0.454∗∗∗ -0.508∗∗∗ -0.561∗∗∗
d eu ij -0.0893∗ -0.162∗∗∗ -0.0865∗∗∗
int anti 0.100∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.0664∗∗
ees soclass lower middle 0.224 -0.239 -0.146
ees soclass middle -0.156 0.0813 -0.191
ees soclass upper -0.0995 -0.273 -0.210
ees soclass upper middle -0.103 0.193 -0.426∗
ees sex 0.130 0.221 0.126
cons 5.084∗∗∗ 5.602∗∗∗ 4.946∗∗∗
N 2830 2227 5377
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Appendix B.9 Ireland
Table 49: Regression results Ireland: extreme parties
1999 2004 2009
d lr ij -0.332∗∗∗ -0.390∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗
d eu ij -0.101∗ -0.0370 -0.306∗∗∗
int ext 0.0704 0.0609 0.121∗∗∗
ees soclass lower middle 0.262 0.0768 -0.253
ees soclass middle 0.246 0.175 -0.147
ees soclass upper -0.612 0.202 -0.931
ees soclass upper middle 0.451∗ 0.198 -0.275
ees sex 0.572∗∗∗ 0.0596 0.175
cons 4.766∗∗∗ 4.942∗∗∗ 4.876∗∗∗
N 2840 5735 5111
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 50: Regression results Ireland: anti–EU position
1999 2004 2009
d lr ij -0.321∗∗∗ -0.386∗∗∗ -0.173∗∗∗
d eu ij -0.141∗∗ -0.00133 -0.303∗∗∗
int anti 0.142∗∗∗ -0.00634 0.129∗∗∗
ees soclass lower middle 0.299 0.0789 -0.245
ees soclass middle 0.274∗ 0.177 -0.136
ees soclass upper -0.735 0.204 -1.016
ees soclass upper middle 0.541∗ 0.199 -0.303
ees sex 0.545∗∗∗ 0.0604 0.156
cons 4.782∗∗∗ 4.929∗∗∗ 4.858∗∗∗
N 2840 5735 5111
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Appendix B.10 Luxembourg
Table 51: Regression results Luxembourg: extreme parties
1999 2009
d lr ij -0.342∗∗∗ -0.503∗∗∗
d eu ij -0.129∗ -0.263∗∗∗
int ext 0.170∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗
ees soclass lower middle 0.595 0.0511
ees soclass middle 0.175 0.128
ees soclass upper 1.205 -0.159
ees soclass upper middle 0.214 0.163
ees sex 0.135 0.329∗∗∗
cons 4.353∗∗∗ 4.888∗∗∗
N 1475 6781
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 52: Regression results Luxembourg: anti–EU position
1999 2009
d lr ij -0.303∗∗∗ -0.411∗∗∗
d eu ij -0.135∗∗ -0.348∗∗∗
int anti 0.162∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗
ees soclass lower middle 0.572 0.0165
ees soclass middle 0.193 0.0570
ees soclass upper 1.209 0.0917
ees soclass upper middle 0.273 0.199
ees sex 0.110 0.369∗∗∗
cons 4.310∗∗∗ 4.687∗∗∗
N 1475 6781
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
126
Appendix B.11 Netherlands
Table 53: Regression results Netherlands: extreme parties
1999 2004 2009
d lr ij -0.343∗∗∗ -0.649∗∗∗ -0.461∗∗∗
d eu ij -0.446∗∗∗ -0.235∗∗∗ -0.281∗∗∗
int ext 0.0862∗∗∗ 0.366∗∗∗ 0.0261
ees soclass lower middle 0.300∗ 0.0323 -0.270
ees soclass middle 0.0761 0.0823 -0.376∗∗∗
ees soclass upper -0.0552 -0.0311 -0.363
ees soclass upper middle 0.161 0.0199 -0.357∗∗
ees sex -0.0896 0.0794 0.0651
cons 5.241∗∗∗ 5.537∗∗∗ 5.735∗∗∗
N 8613 11203 9261
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 54: Regression results Netherlands: anti–EU position
1999 2004 2009
d lr ij -0.342∗∗∗ -0.621∗∗∗ -0.460∗∗∗
d eu ij -0.449∗∗∗ -0.156∗∗∗ -0.339∗∗∗
int anti 0.270∗∗∗ 0.0635∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
ees soclass lower middle 0.293∗ 0.0448 -0.238
ees soclass middle 0.101 0.103 -0.323∗∗
ees soclass upper -0.0173 0.0144 -0.245
ees soclass upper middle 0.201 0.0752 -0.233∗
ees sex -0.114 0.0616 0.0568
cons 5.221∗∗∗ 5.479∗∗∗ 5.715∗∗∗
N 8613 11203 9261
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Appendix B.12 Portugal
Table 55: Regression results Portugal: extreme parties
1999 2004 2009
d lr ij -0.624∗∗∗ -0.413∗∗∗ -0.641∗∗∗
d eu ij 0.170∗∗∗ -0.00546 -0.0694
int ext -0.450∗∗∗ -0.0675∗ 0.0377
ees soclass lower middle 0.343 -0.0272 -0.320∗
ees soclass middle 0.592∗∗ -0.111 -0.164
ees soclass upper 1.622 1.266∗ -0.364
ees soclass upper middle 0.576 -0.0652 -0.105
ees sex 0.0120 0.143 -0.0112
cons 5.508∗∗∗ 5.122∗∗∗ 5.857∗∗∗
N 1679 4510 3702
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 56: Regression results Portugal: anti–EU position
1999 2004 2009
d lr ij -0.797∗∗∗ -0.421∗∗∗ -0.638∗∗∗
d eu ij -0.206∗∗∗ -0.0747∗∗ -0.0268
int anti 0.0796 0.134∗∗∗ -0.0225
ees soclass lower middle 0.309 -0.0163 -0.321∗
ees soclass middle 0.508∗∗ -0.0547 -0.170
ees soclass upper 1.796∗ 1.414∗ -0.347
ees soclass upper middle 0.492 -0.00442 -0.116
ees sex 0.0883 0.123 -0.00849
cons 6.244∗∗∗ 5.103∗∗∗ 5.842∗∗∗
N 1679 4510 3702
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
128
Appendix C Political Party Abbreviations
In order to keep everything in a managable framwork and size, in the tables
presented in the text and appendix ??, abbreviations for party names instead
of the full names of parties. The following table lists the full names of parties
in English next to their abbreviations as used elswhere in the text. The order
in which parties appear in the table have no meaning.
Table 57: Party name abbreviations and full name
ABBREVIATION FULL NAME
Austria
GRU The Greens – The Green Alternative
SPO Social Democratic Party of Austria
FPO Freedom Party of Austria
LIF Lieberal Forum
OVP Austrian People’s Party
BZO Alliance for the future of Austria
Finland
VAS Left Alliance
France
PCF French Communist Party
Denmark
KF Conservatives
Netherlands
LPF Fortuyn List
CDA Christian Democrats
Greece
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ABBREVIATION FULL NAME
KKE Communist Party Greece
PASOK Panhellenic Socialist Movement
Luxembourg
DP Democratic Party
Germany
CDU Christian Democratic Union
Portugal
PSD Social Democratic Party
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Appendix D Abstract: German
Diese Diplomarbeit bescha¨ftigt sich mit den Auswirkungen die europa¨is-
che Integration auf gewisse Elemente des politischen Wettbewerbs auf der
nationalen Ebene haben ko¨nnte. Die europa¨ische Integration beru¨hrt in-
zwischen politische Bereiche die einst als domaine re´serve´ der National-
staaten galten. Als Ausgangspunkt wird auf die Idee zurckgegriffen, dass
nun nationale Systeme der demokratischen Repra¨sentation von Europa be-
troffen werden sollten. Es gibt Studien die sich mit solchen Fragen beschftigt
haben, wobei diese den Fokus auf nationale Parlamentswahlen als Ausdruck
der repra¨sentativen Verknu¨pfung zwischen Bu¨rgern und der politischen Elite
gelegt haben.
Wie diese Arbeiten beschftigt sich die Diplomarbeit mit diesem Aspekt
des politischen Wettbewerbs in Bezug auf die europische Vereinigung. Basierend
auf der Literatur in diesem Bereich der Politikwissenschaft, wird ein theo-
retisches Modell konstruiert das europische Integration mit der Attraktivitt
politischer Parteien als Wahlmo¨glichkeit verbindet. Mit diesem Modell we-
icht die Diplomarbeit vom gela¨ufigerem Zugang zum Thema etwas ab indem
sie den Fokus auf die Bildung von Nutzen im Rahmen eines zweistufigem ra-
tional choice’ Modells verschiebt. Die zweite Stufe der tatsa¨chlich getroffenen
Wahl wird nicht behandelt.
Notwendige Bedingungen unter denen die europa¨ische Integration po-
tentiell diesen Bereich der nationalen Politik beeinflussen ko¨nnte werden
hergeleitet und empirisch u¨berpru¨ft. Es wird gezeigt, dass alle notwendi-
gen Bedingungen gelten. Vier Hypothesen werden aufgestellt die behaupten,
dass politische Parteien vom Thema der europa¨ischen Integration profitieren
ko¨nnen, dass sich solche Effekte u¨ber die Zeit versta¨rkt haben, dass extreme
Parteien mehr als andere davon profitieren ko¨nnen und dass bei Individuen
die sich eher als Gegner der europa¨ischen Vereinigung bekennen dieses Thema
eine gro¨ere Rolle spielt.
Die empirische Analyse kommt auf gemischte Ergebnisse. Die erste und
zweite Hypothese werden belegt, die dritte kann weder verworfen noch angenom-
men werden und fu¨r die vierte werden keine Hinweise gefunden. Die Diplo-
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marbeit zeigt, dass die Bedingungen, unter denen das Thema der europa¨is-
chen Integration mglicherweise ihren Platz im politischen Wettbewerb auf
nationaler Ebene einnehmen kann, gegeben sind. Zudem wird gezeigt, dass
diese Bedingungen nicht nur existieren, sondern dass die Europa¨ische Union
sich merklich auf die Beziehung zwischen Bu¨rgern und politischer Elite auswirkt.
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